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PARENTS AS FIDUCIARIES
Elizabeth S. Scott*
Robert E. Scott**
T RADITIONALLY, the law has deferred to the rights of bio-
logical parents in regulating the parent-child relationship.
More recently, as the emphasis of legal regulation has shifted to
protecting children's interests, critics have targeted the traditional
focus on parents' rights as impeding the goal of promoting chil-
dren's welfare. Some contemporary scholars argue instead for a
"child-centered perspective,"' in contrast to the current regime
under which biological parents continue to have important legal
interests in their relationship with their children. The underlying
assumption of this claim is that the rights of parents and the inter-
ests of children often are conflicting, and that greater recognition
of one interest means diminished importance to the other.
One way of thinking about a legal regime that seeks to harmo-
nize this conflict is to imagine that the parent's legal relationship to
the child is shaped by fiduciary responsibilities toward the child
rather than by inherent rights derived from status.2 Fiduciaries in
law are agents who occupy a position of special confidence, superi-
* University Professor and Robert C. Taylor Research Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law.
** Dean and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of
Law.
We are thankful to Clay Gillette, Charles Goetz, Douglas Leslie, Jody Kraus, Saul
Levmore, Steve Sugarman and George Triantis for their helpful comments on prior drafts
and to Eric Graben for excellent research assistance. We also thank participants in a
workshop at the University of Virginia and the Symposium conference.
1 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993). Woodhouse argues that
gestational and social parenting should receive legal protection, while the fact of biological
parenthood should have little relevance.
2 Woodhouse describes parenthood using the model of stewardship. See id. at 1755.
Although commentators have suggested rhetorically that the parental role be defined as
that of a fiduciary, no one has rigorously examined the implications of defining the legal
role in this way. See, e.g., Francis J. Catania, Jr., Accounting to Ourselves for Ourselves:
An Analysis of Adjudication in the Resolution of Child Custody Disputes, 71 Neb. L. Rev.
1228, 1231-32 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of
Children, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1317, 1318-19 (1994).
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ority, or influence, and thus are subject to strict and non-negotiable
duties of loyalty and reasonable diligence in acting on behalf of
their principals. Characterizing parents as fiduciaries suggests that
the parent-child relationship shares important features with other
legal relationships that have been similarly defined, such as trust-
ees and trust beneficiaries, corporate directors and shareholders,
executors and legatees, and guardians and wards. Basic structural
similarities are apparent. There are information asymmetries in
this family relationship that are analogous to those of other fiduci-
ary relationships. Moreover, satisfactory performance by parents,
like that of other fiduciaries, requires considerable discretion, and
children, like other principals, are not in a position to direct or con-
trol that performance. Here, as in other contexts, the challenge for
legal regulation is to encourage the parent to act so as to serve the
interests of the child rather than her own conflicting interests, and
yet to do so in a context in which monitoring parental behavior is
difficult.
Particular features of the parent-child relationship distinguish it
from most traditional fiduciary relationships, however, and thus
present some unique challenges. This relationship is broader in
scope than are many other fiduciary relationships. Beyond this,
the parental relationship, once established, has intrinsic value for
the child that extends beyond successful performance of caretaking
tasks.4 Obviously, the unique characteristics of family relationships
3 "The fiduciary relation may exist wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the
relationship be that of blood, business, friendship, or association, by one person in another
who are in a position to have and exercise or do have and exercise influence over each
other." Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916); see also Charles
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1126-
30 (1981) (summarizing the strict obligations imposed upon fiduciaries for the benefit of
principals).
4 The loss of the relationship with a parent can inflict serious costs on the child.
Research on divorce indicates that reduced contact with fathers is a source of significant
harm to many children. See E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox & Roger Cox, The
Aftermath of Divorce, in Relationships: Mother/Child, Father/Child (Joseph H. Stevens,
Jr. & Marilyn Matthews eds., 1978) [hereinafter Hetherington et al., Aftermath of
Divorce]; E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox & Roger Cox, Divorced Fathers, 25 Fain.
Coordinator 417,424-26 (1976); E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox & Roger Cox, Effects
of Divorce on Parents and Children, in Non-Traditional Families: Parenting and Child
Development 233 (M. Lamb ed., 1982); see also Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly,
Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope With Divorce (1980); Judith S.
Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade
240i [Vol. 81:2401
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necessarily shape legal regulation in idiosyncratic ways. Nonethe-
less, thinking systematically about parents as agents and fiduciaries
is a useful project.5 By employing this framework, we can draw on
lessons learned from the legal regulation of fiduciaries in other
contexts, and on the insights of legal and agency theory that have
shaped our understanding of how the law can function to optimize
these relationships. Such an exercise may illuminate the deep
structure of the regime of legal and extralegal norms that shape
parental behavior.
Agency theory identifies two means of reducing conflicts of
interest between agents and principals. Bonding encourages agents
to align their interests with those of their principals, while monitor-
ing facilitates the oversight of agents' performance to detect selfish
behavior.6 Fiduciary law utilizes varying combinations of these
mechanisms in different settings to reduce or avoid conflicts of
interest. Viewed through this lens, much contemporary regulation
of the parent-child relationship can be understood as serving either
bonding or monitoring functions. There are, however, some
aspects of family law that seem sharply dissonant with this perspec-
tive, reflecting in part the lingering influence of traditional legal
structures regulating family-state relations.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief account of the growing
criticism that legal policy regulating the parent-child relationship is
driven excessively by the objective of protecting parents' rights.
Critics argue that children's welfare rather than parents' rights
After Divorce 143-44 (1989); Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, Effects of Divorce on
the Visiting Father-Child Relationship, 137 Am. J. Psychiatry 1534 (1980) [hereinafter
Wallerstein & Kelly, Visiting Father-Child Relationship]; Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B.
Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experience of the Child in Later Latency, 46 Am. J.
Orthopsychiatry 256 (1976) [hereinafter Wallerstein & Kelly, Parental Divorce: Experience
of the Child in Later Latency]. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit argue against state
interference with even suboptimal parent-child relationships because of the importance of
this bond to children. See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Before the
Best Interests of the Child 3-25, 75-86 (1979).
5 The utility of this perspective depends in part on whether the normative premise of the
focus on children's welfare is attractive, a point which might be debated. We do not
propose to enter this debate. Rather, our purpose is to examine the implications of
thinking about family relationships from a fiduciary perspective, assuming that the
normative goal is to advance the interests of children.
6 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976).
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should define the legal relationship between parent and child. We
suggest that the critics' challenge argues for a focus on the instru-
mental effects of legal regulation on this relationship. This
approach asks to what extent the law influences parents to act in
ways that promote their children's interests, and to what extent the
focus on parents' rights is incompatible with that objective. The
answer to those questions is complicated by the dynamics of the
parent-child relationship, and especially by the feedback effects
between parental performance and parental rights.
In Part II, we develop an informal model of the parent as fiduci-
ary. We use the tools of agency theory to identify the optimal com-
binations of extralegal and legal arrangements that seem to best
reduce conflicts of interest within the parent-child relationship.
Owing to the peculiar characteristics of this relationship, the utility
of specific mechanisms varies depending on whether or not the
parent lives in a family unit with the child. In the intact family, the
dominating effects of informal norms reduce the demand for exten-
sive legal regulation. When the family is fractiured, the power of
extralegal constraints is diminished and more elaborate legal rules
are required to ameliorate potential conflicts.
In Part III, we apply this relational model of parents as fiducia-
ries to contemporary family law. We conclude that, in many
respects, current law fits comfortably within, the fiduciary para-
digm. Indeed, legal rules that are justified (and criticized) in terms
of parental rights can be better rationalized as necessary comple-
ments to fiduciary obligations. To be sure, some aspects of current
law appear to intensify conflicts of interest between parent and
child. Many of the rules governing divorce, for example, seem to
undermine children's welfare by encouraging parents to exercise
their rights selfishly. But the central insight of the relational
approach is to focus attention on the feedback effects between
parental rights and children's interests. The contract metaphor
makes explicit what is implicit in contemporary family law: paren-
tal "rights" are granted as ex ante compensation for the satisfac-
tory performance of voluntarily assumed responsibilities to provide
for the child's interests.
We conclude, therefore, that the criticism of contemporary fam-
ily law as being unduly "rights-centered" is misplaced. The para-
dox of modem family law is the uneasy coexistence of legal
2404 [Vol. 81:2401
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outcomes that largely can be explained and justified within a
framework of reciprocal rights and responsibilities, together with
legal rhetoric that fails to make explicit the nexus between this
framework and the normative goal of promoting the welfare of
children.
I. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A. The Critique of Parents' Rights
Legal deference to the claims of biological parents recently has
come under attack in the courts, in the academic literature, and in
the popular media.7 Cases such as the highly publicized dispute
between the DeBoers and Daniel Schmidt over the custody of
"Baby Jessica"8 contribute to a view that the law, frozen in ancient
7 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1983) (observing that a "mere
biological relationship" cannot alone establish parental rights); see also Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (denying challenge of
biological father to California statute establishing conclusive presumption that mother's
husband at child's birth is legal father of child); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing
Parenthood, 98 Yale L.J. 293, 295 (1988) (advocating an emphasis on parental
responsibilities rather than parental rights); Woodhouse, supra note 1 (placing the child's
interests at the center of family law); Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, Time, July 19,
1993, at 44 (relating the pain of couples forced to relinquish an adopted child to its
biological parents); Geoffrey Cowley, Who's Looking After the Interests of Children?,
Newsweek, August 16, 1993, at 54 (emphasizing the vulnerability of adopted children
under current custody laws).
s See DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Baby Girl Clausen), 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993); In re
B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). "Baby Jessica" was given up for adoption by her
mother only hours after birth, without the knowledge of her biological father, Daniel
Schmidt, and placed in temporary custody with the DeBoers. A few weeks later, upon
learning that he was the father of the child, Schmidt initiated legal efforts to gain custody,
on the grounds that he had not consented to the termination of his parental rights. During
the pendency of the legal battle, Jessica remained in the home of the DeBoers, who
resisted Schmidt's efforts to reclaim his daughter. Despite testimony from experts who
warned that return to her father's custody would be emotionally traumatic for Jessica, the
Iowa Supreme Court ruled that Schmidt was legally entitled to custody of his daughter.
Although a subsequent determination by a Michigan court concluded that transferring
custody was not in Jessica's best interests, the Michigan Supreme Court deferred to the
jurisdiction of the Iowa courts, enforcing the order to return Jessica to her biological
parents. For popular accounts of the case, see Bill Hewitt, The Battle for Baby Jessica,
People, May 31, 1993, at 32; Jon D. Hull, The Ties That Traumatize, Time, April 12, 1993,
at 48. A more recent example involves "Baby Richard," whose father's parental rights
were reinstated almost four years after his placement in an adoptive home. See In re
Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I11.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
The "Baby Jessica" case has proved an attractive target for scholarly criticism of
contemporary family law. See Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from
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doctrine, accords unwarranted legal protection to biological par-
ents in ways that are both directly harmful and symbolically corro-
sive to the interests of their children.9 For example, recognition of
the rights of non-custodial biological parents can undermine a rela-
tionship between the child and a more suitable social parent. 10
Further, the latitude given to parents in rearing their children is
seen as excessive, allowing some parents to inflict unmonitored and
unsanctioned harm on their children." More indirectly, to the
extent that the law emphasizes parental rights, it encourages par-
ents' inclination to put their own interests before those of their
children, both in the intact family and on divorce or dissolution.
However controversial this issue may be today, the tradition of
legal protection of parental rights has deep historical r.oots. 12
Before the twentieth century, the combined status of biological
Transfer Trauma in a Contested Adoption Case, 2 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 41 (1995);
Suellyn Scarnecchia, Who Is Jessica's Mother? Defining Motherhood Through Reality, 3
Am. U. J. Gender & L. 1 (1994). Scarnecchia, a professor at the University of Michigan
School of Law, physically delivered Jessica from the DeBoers to the Schmidts. See also
Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the
Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11, 72-84 (1994) (arguing that the mechanistic legal doctrine
governing the "Baby Jessica" case failed to honor Jessica's individual interests as a child).
9 For general critiques of the emphasis on parental rights in modem family law, see
Goldstein et. al, supra note 4, at 54; Bartlett, supra note 7, at 295; Woodhouse, supra note
1, at 1756, 1809-12. Similarly, James Dwyer argues for abandoning parental rights
altogether and according parents merely child-rearing privileges, the contours of which are
subject to the rights of the children. James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1371, 1374 (1994).
10 Critics charge that policies grounded in parental rights empower unmarried fathers
(like Daniel Schmidt) to derail an adoption that is in the child's interest. See supra note 8;
see also Bartlett, supra note 7, at 322, 324 n.137 (arguing that the emphasis on parental
rights permits fathers to exploit the legal system to the detriment of the child). These
policies also devalue the custodial claims of stepparents and other third parties who have
functioned as parents, and inhibit the termination of the parental rights of unfit parents to
allow permanent placement.of children in foster care. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at
1784-95.
11 The case of Joshua DeShaney is often cited as demonstrating the law's excessive
deference toward abusive parents. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Joshua was severely beaten by his father following many
episodes of abuse. Although his case was being monitored by a social worker during the
period of the abusive treatment, the county failed to intervene and prevent the abuse. See
also infra note 111 (comparing DeShaney to other cases of parental abuse).
12 See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 737-39 (1988); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1041-50 (1992).
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parenthood and marriage signified a legal authority of almost limit-
less scope. Until the social reform movement at the beginning of
this century, 13 the state took little interest in family governance. 14
Parents, particularly fathers as heads of household, had extensive
legal authority over the lives of their children.15 Parental rights
were understood to be grounded in natural law and were not
dependent on behavior that promoted the child's interest. 6 Par-
ents' interest under traditional law was property-like in many
respects.' 7  A parent's right to the custody of his children so
approximated property ownership that it could be transferred by
contract,'8 and lost only by abandonment or unfitness.' 9 In the
1920s, the United States Supreme Court elevated parental rights to
constitutional stature, restricting the extent to which the state can
13 This movement included the creation of the social work profession, with its mission of
promoting the welfare of children, the founding of the juvenile court (characterized by
early reformers as an institution that could perform a parental function, when parents
failed), and the development of widespread public education. See Murray Levine &
Adeline Levine, A Social History of Helping Services: Clinic, Court, School, and
Community (1970); Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (2d
ed. 1977).
14 Indeed, Anthony Platt argues that the reform efforts of the Progressive Era were
driven by a desire to create a legal means for state supervision of working class parents.
See Platt, supra note 13, at xxii-xxix.
15 See sources cited supra note 12. Even today, parental rights operate against the state,
third parties, and the child herself. These rights include discretion over custody, discipline,
education, medical treatment, religious upbringing, and earnings and services. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879, 884
(1984).
16 Bartlett discusses the natural law origins of parental rights. See Bartlett, supra note
15, at 887-90; see also Risting v. Sparboe, 162 N.W. 592, 593-94 (Iowa 1917) (holding that
"utter selfishness alone cannot be allowed to cut off the natural claim of parents to the
custody of their own offspring").
17 See sources cited supra note 12. Indeed, before the Industrial Revolution, children
were economic assets of their parents in agrarian society, contributing to the
characterization of the parents' interest as a property right. See John J. Dempsey, The
Family and Public Policy 3 (1981).
18 This transaction could occur, under ancient English common law, when parents
placed children in indentured service or apprenticeship. Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M.
Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party
Custody Disputes, 27 Emory L.J. 209, 210 & n.5 (1978).
19 See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). The loss of parental rights
through abandonment is firmly based on property concepts. Unfitness is, of course, a
different matter.
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override parental authority.20 Although modem courts vigorously
reject the characterization of children as the property of their par-
ents, many argue that this legacy continues to cast a shadow.21
In fact, the situation is even more complex than the critics recog-
nize. Although many assume that outcomes such as that reached
in the DeBoers-Schmidt dispute result from the failure to reform
archaic legal doctrine, the extension of parental rights to unmar-
ried biological fathers is actually a relatively recent development. 22
Historically, unmarried fathers were invisible parents, presumed by
courts and legislatures to have no legal interest in their children. 3
This presents an apparent puzzle, given the patriarchal character of
traditional family law (although the legal response may reflect, as
Mary Shanley has argued, a desire to shield fathers from financial
responsibility for children that they produced outside of mar-
riage).24 In any event, legal policy rested on the very plausible
empirical assumption that most unmarried fathers had little inter-
est in having a relationship with their children.25 Today, the rheto-
ric of parental rights extends to this group of parents, and consent
of the unmarried father to the adoption of his child (either by
20 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the fundamental right
to control education of one's child is constitutionally protected); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that an Oregon law requiring children to attend public
schools was an unconstitutional violation of the fundamental right to control education of
one's child); see also Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 997 (arguing that these cases gave a
constitutional underpinning to the concept that children are property of their parents).
21 See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 997, 1113-15; Bartlett, supra note 15, at 882.
22 Traditionally, unmarried mothers had more robust rights than fathers. For example,
before Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the mother's, but not the father's, consent to
adoption was required under most adoption statutes. The parental rights of unmarried
mothers, however, were (and are) more fragile than those of married parents, at least in
practical effect. Unmarried mothers are much more likely to be subject to state
supervision and intervention as a part of receipt of public assistance.
23 See John R. Hamilton, Note, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His Child's
Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 949 (1987-88) ("Until a few years ago, unwed fathers were
ignored by or received virtually no protection from either the United States Constitution
or the statutes of most states."); Elizabeth R. Stanton, Note, The Rights of the Biological
Father: From Adoption & Custody to Surrogate Motherhood, 12 Vt. L. Rev. 87, 92 (1987).
24 See Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Father's Rights, Adoption and Sex Equality: Gender-
Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 60,66-70 (1995). Shanley
contrasts the lot of unmarried fathers ("shielded from financial responsibility for his
'spurious' offspring") with that of mothers ("[A] woman who bore children outside of
marriage was 'ruined'. . . ."). See id. at 69.
25 The exigencies of administrative efficiency in the placement of children supported a
policy of presuming that unmarried fathers lacked a legal interest in their children.
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strangers or by a stepparent) has become a factor of much greater
importance.26 The outcome in the DeBoers case, vindicating the
paternal rights of Daniel Schmidt, fits into this legal framework.
Outside of the adoption context, non-custodial biological parents
often win custody contests with stepparents and other third parties
who have functioned in a parental role.2 7 To the consternation of
critics, traditional law gives little legal protection to the relation-
ship between the faithful stepparent and the child if the biological
parent is fit.2- Similarly poignant are cases in which a grandparent
or other relative has assumed the care of a child who is neglected
or informally abandoned by his parent. Months or even years
later, the wayward parent who mends her ways may assert her
parental rights and often successfully reclaim custody. 9
Critics of parental rights also decry the legal response to seri-
ously deficient parental conduct. State agents are constrained from
directly monitoring the quality of parental care by policies that
support parental authority and family privacy.30 Many critics view
these policies as leaving children vulnerable and without adequate
26 Modern doctrine has evolved from the 1972 Supreme Court opinion in Stanley, 405
U.S. at 648, which signalled that the claims of at least some unmarried fathers warrant
constitutional protection. In the years since Stanley, the Court has explored the
constitutional scope of parental rights in several cases involving unmarried fathers.
27 Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1048 nn.245-47, describes several such cases. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Tipple, 184 P. 1005 (Ariz. 1919) (holding that a child who lived over three years
with her grandparents following her mother's death must be returned to the father, absent
clear showing of incompetency); In re Salter, 76 P. 51, 52 (Cal. 1904) (directing lower court
to award guardianship of a child to his father rather than the child's grandmother if father
found competent); Lee v. Lee, 65 So. 585,588 (Fla. 1914) (ruling that a father had the right
to custody of his seven-year-old child despite fact that child had been raised by cousins
from the age of nine days); Hernandez v. Thomas, 39 So. 641, 645 (Fla. 1905) (finding a
competent father is generally preferred as custodian of his child over other parties, here a
grandmother); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374-75 (Utah 1982) (holding that absent a
showing of parental unfitness, state may not terminate parental rights, even if such
termination would be in the best interest of the child).
28 Traditional law is slowly changing in this area, but courts still generally favor
biological parents in these contests. For a discussion of the legal protection of stepparents'
rights, see David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning from Social Sciences: A Model for
Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 Dick. L. Rev. 49, 56-57 (1992). For a
survey of statutes covering the rights of third parties, see American Bar Association,
"Rights of Third Party," 25 Faro. L.Q. 26 app. (1991).
29 See supra note 27.
30 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) (discussing the legal tradition of
noninterference in the family).
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protection from their parents' neglectful or abusive behavior.'
Even when children are in state custody, the spectre of parental
rights casts a shadow. Foster care placement tends to extend indef-
initely for a large percentage of these children,32 who are neither
returned to their parents' custody nor available for adoption
because parental rights are not terminated. Children get older
(and less adoptable) while parents are given expansive opportuni-
ties to remedy the conditions that resulted in the removal. 33 Mean-
31 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 63-64. A particularly grim and poignant
illustration of this point is the case of Lisa Steinberg, who was illegally adopted by New
York lawyer Joel Steinberg and his live-in companion, Hedda Nussbaum. In 1987, after
years of abuse, Lisa was beaten to death at age six by Joel Steinberg. Steinberg repeatedly
beat Nussbaum as well, and police had been to their apartment several times prior to the
fatal beating to answer neighbors' complaints. Nussbaum's coworkers had tried
unsuccessfully to block the adoption, and Steinberg never formally registered the adoption
to avoid investigation. Two complaints of possible child abuse were investigated in 1983
and 1984, but were rejected as unsubstantiated by investigators from the city's Human
Resources Administration. See Ken Gross, A 'Wicked Rage Claims a Child, People, Nov.
23, 1987, at 44.
32 See Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev.
599, 610-13 (1973) (a classic early account of the problems with the foster care system).
Despite efforts to improve the situation of children in foster care, the average stay in foster
care in many jurisdictions still exceeds two years. David J. Herring, Exploring the Political
Roles of the Family: Justifications for Permanency Planning for Children, 26 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 183 (1995), cites several studies in support of this assertion:
A New York adoption study revealed that in 1989, a child, on average, spent 4.6
years in foster care before being eligible for adoption. Debra Ratterman,
Termination Barriers: Speeding Adoption in New York State Through Reducing
Delays in Termination of Parental Rights Cases at iii (1991); see also Permanency
Planning Task Force Court Appointed Special Advocates Subcommittee,
Demographics of Permanency in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (1992) (reporting
that of the children living in foster care in Allegheny County, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, 44% had been in foster care for more than two years); Voluntary
Cooperative Information System & American Public Welfare Association,
Characteristics of Children in Substitute and Adoptive Care: A Statistical Summary
of the VCIS National Child Welfare Database 116-17 (1993) . . . (summarizing
statistics showing that by the end of fiscal year 1989, 39.5% of children living in
substitute care had been there for more than two years, 15.5% had been in care
between two and three years, 13.4% had been in care between three to five years,
and 10.6% had been in care five years or more).
Id. at 190 n.50.
33 Robert Mnookin reported twenty years ago that social workers are often reluctant to
terminate parental rights because to do so necessitates a separate legal proceeding, often
with more stringent standards than those required for initial removal, and because
termination of parental rights is seen as a drastic measure. See Mnookin, supra note 32, at
612-13. The problem has not been resolved. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471(a)(15), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (codified in scattered
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while, children's relationships with foster parents receive little legal
protection (and children are moved from one foster family to
another) on the ground that a strong attachment might undermine
family ties with the biological parents.34
Considerable reform efforts, including comprehensive federal
legislation, have focused on the problem of foster care "drift," but
with few positive results.3 5 Policies promoting family reunification
have had mixed success, because a large portion of parents are
unable to resume care, or fail to do so adequately. Moreover, sys-
temic efforts directed at facilitating termination of parental rights
and adoption in appropriate cases have been largely unsuccessful.
Terminating parental rights continues to be a costly and cumber-
some process, owing to procedural and substantive requirements
sections of 42 U.S.C.), imposed a requirement that state welfare agencies make reasonable
efforts to avoid removing children from their homes or to return them to their homes after
staying in foster care. According to David Herring, social workers generally fear having to
prove "reasonable efforts" in court and thus decline to seek termination of parental rights.
See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of
Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare
System, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 139, 180 (1992). The Department of Health and Human
Services confirms this observation: "Over 75% of the respondents in the State survey
indicate that the inability of the child welfare agencies to meet the 'reasonable efforts'
standard to the satisfaction of State courts in a timely manner is the primary barrier to
implementing permanent plans of adoption." Office of Inspector General, Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., Barriers to Freeing Children for Adoption 11 (1991), cited in Herring,
supra, at 180 n.117.
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982), the Supreme Court held that due
process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness to terminate
parents' rights. Some observers argue that after Santosky, state agencies increasingly tend
to maintain children in foster homes for long periods of time while they accumulate "clear
and convincing evidence." See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 63.
34 Mnookin, supra note 32, at 612-13, 624-25. The phenomenon of foster care "drift"
has been well documented. See Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation": The Battle for
Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 593, 595 (1992); Herring, supra note 33, at 140-41.
35 The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), created a two-prong policy initiative to
redress foster care "drift." The first prong emphasizes maintaining the family unit, by
discouraging removal of the child and encouraging states to promote reunification of the
family through services that would facilitate that end. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 625-27 (1988); see
also S. Rep. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448,
1450 (describing the purpose of the act). The second prong focuses on efficient monitoring
and review procedures, so that if parents cannot resume custody, parental rights can be
terminated and adoption facilitated. See 42 i.S.C. §§ 670-73 (1988). There is little
evidence that the Act has led to substantial improvements.
Virginia Law Review
directed toward protecting parental interests. 6 For the population
of children in foster care, a large gap separates the cases in which
parents can resume care of their child from the cases in which
parenting is so clearly deficient that state agents pursue termina-
tion of parental rights.37 The interests of the children in this middle
category, the critics argue, are poorly served by policies that pro-
tect parents' rights. 8
Advocates invoke child development theory in attacking legal
deference toward biological parents' rights. Attachment theory
emphasizes the critical importance of the relationship between the
child and her primary caretaker for healthy psychological develop-
ment. Although this caretaker most commonly is the child's bio-
logical mother, the biological relationship in itself is unimportant
under the theory. Three psychoanalysts, Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert Solnit, have been particularly influential in
popularizing this perspective. 9 They argue that the welfare of the
child would be promoted if biology were deemphasized, and the
law focused on protecting the relationship between the child and
her psychological parent, the adult who cares for her needs on a
day-to-day basis. In the view of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, the
biological parent who does not fill the role of psychological parent
becomes a stranger to the child, and should not have a privileged
legal status.4 °
The critics of parental rights often focus on cases of horrendous
parental conduct,41 or on contexts in which parents use a legal enti-
tlement to claim (or reclaim) a relationship with their child which
36 See supra note 33; Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 60-6i. Moreover, although the
Supreme Court has declined to hold that a parent has a right to an attorney in any
termination proceeding, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981),
almost all states provide counsel for parents.
37 In 1984, only eleven percent of children in foster care were adopted. Edith Fein &
Anthony N. Meluccio, Permanency Planning: Another Remedy in Jeopardy?, Soc. Sci.
Rev. 335, 340-41 (1992). This statistic is largely attributable to the procedural barriers
precluding termination of parental rights. See Mnookin, supra note 32, at 612-13
(identifying the strict legal requirements for termination of parental rights as a deterrent to
the initiation of termination proceedings).
38 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 63-64.
39 See Goldstein et al., supra note 4.
40 See id. at 16-28, 47-48.
41 For examples of such cases, see infra note 111 (reviewing the child abuse cases of
Joshua DeShaney, Susan Smith, and Elizabeth Steinberg).
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in some sense they have not earned.42 A more subtle critique
focuses on the intangible but perhaps more pervasive effects of
contemporary "rights talk' '43 on family relationships. A rights
framework is grounded in autonomy and protection of individual
interests. Thus, it reinforces the parents' tendency to elevate self-
interest over the interests of their child.' As Carl Schneider sug-
gests, thinking in terms of rights "encourages us to think about
what constrains us from doing what we want, not what obligates us
to do what we ought. '45 Arguably, the legal emphasis on parental
rights (and the cultural rhetoric that it generates) influences par-
ents' behavior in a number of.ways. It might affect the allocation
of financial resources and parental efforts between family and per-
sonal pursuits, as well as the inclination to consider the child's wel-
fare in making family decisions.46 An incentive to act selfishly can,
of course, lead to abuse and neglect in extreme cases. A more sub-
tle but destructive impact on the stability of family relationships
42 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 72-84 (recounting the custody dispute underlying
the "Baby Jessica" case).
43 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 121-
30 (1991) (criticizing excessive emphasis on rights in American society).
44 Many family law scholars have criticized the law's emphasis on rights in this context
as undermining family relationships and failing to express the importance of moral
responsibility. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status
of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests,
81 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1983). Carl Schneider describes the decline of moral discourse in
family law. See Schneider, supra note 30. See also Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and
Divorce in Western Law (1987) (comparing the individual rights-based approach to
abortion and divorce in the United States with a more responsibility-based approach under
Western European laws); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State,
Law and Family in the United States and Western Europe 311-12 (1989) (describing the
impact of law in ihaping how people think and feel about personal commitments and the
possibility that law may contribute unintentionally to "dis-integrating" trends in families);
Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819 (1985) (arguing that while family law tends to be
explained in terms of individual rights, it more properly should be seen as an
implementation of relational values).
45 Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 151,
162-63 (1988).
46 A well-publicized and somewhat bizarre example of parental selfishness involved a
couple who spent several days vacationing in Mexico, leaving their elementary-school-age
children at home to fend for themselves. For details, see Jennifer Lenhart & Flynn
McRoberts, Abandoned Kids' Parents Land in Jail, Chi. Trib., Dec. 30, 1992, at 1; Lindsey
Tanner, A Year After Vacationing Couple Left Kids Alone, People Still Ask 'Why?,' Chi.
Trib. Evening Update, Dec. 20, 1993, at 2.
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results if parents are less motivated to preserve the family in the
face of marital stress, or, if the family dissolves, to maintain a rela-
tionship with the child and provide financial support.47  The
regime of no-fault divorce may exemplify the effects of a rights-
based conception of the parent-child relationship.48 By making
divorce easy, the law signals that, in making the decision to
divorce, parents are not required to weigh the interests of their
children.49
B. A Relational Approach
Although the critics whose concerns we have articulated concur
that beneficial family law reforms would deemphasize parental
entitlement, there is no consensus about how best to promote chil-
dren's welfare. One alternative is to enhance the state's role as
parens patriae within the traditional paradigm, which purports to
balance parental rights against the interest of the state in promot-
ing the welfare of children. 50 This approach would demand a
larger state presence in the family, with increased supervision of
parental care and greater readiness to terminate parental rights.
While this perspective does not focus directly on the parent-child
relationship, its effect is to discount the interests of parents and to
reduce parental authority and rights. This is because the interest-
balancing approach pits the welfare of children against the interest
of parents and presumes that the latter will be diminished if the
former is enhanced.
Simlly shifting the focus of legal regulation toward greater pro-
tection of the needs of children is unhelpful, in our view. This is so
47 Carl Schneider argues that one of the factors behind the recent rise in tolerance of
divorce and non-marital relations is the American tradition of liberal individualism. See
Schneider, supra note 30, at 1839-42. Barbara Woodhouse refers to the emphasis on
parental rights as "[t]his destructive emphasis." Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1812. Mary
Ann Glendon states that "[it is still more regrettable when the legal system inadvertently
fosters irresponsible behavior, as has been the case with certain aspects of American family
law." Glendon, supra note 43, at 105.
48 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va.
L. Rev. 9, 25-37 (1990).
49 This is not to say, of course, that parents necessarily or even generally ignore their
children's interest in deciding to divorce.
50 This interest-balancing approach has characterized legal policy and constitutional
doctrine toivard families since the turn of the century. For a discussion of these
countervailing interests, see Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 37-46.
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not because such a perspective misunderstands the social goals that
drive the regulation of parent-child relationships, but rather
because a child-centered approach, standing alone, will not lead
reliably to legal rules that effect those objectives. Presumably, the
social goal at stake in the regulation of the parent-child relation-
ship is to ensure children the care necessary for their development
into healthy, productive adults. This goal is more likely to be
achieved if the law focuses principally opn the relationship between
parent and child, rather than on the child's needs per se. Parents
are not fungible child rearers. The link between parent and child
has substantial and intrinsic value to the child; the substitution of
another parent and/or termination of the relationship is accom-
plished only at considerable cost to the child.5 ' Moreover, as a
general matter, the state is not well suited to substitute for parents
in the job of rearing children. If the calculus used to determine the
optimal state role focuses on the child's interest discounted by the
(now less weighty) parental interest, the presumption that these
interests are inherently in tension persists and the central impor-
tance of the relationship is likely to be obscured. Moreover,
assuming that we are correct that parents presumptively are the
"first best" child-rearers, an interest-balancing approach offers no
grounding for a regulatory regime that promotes optimal parental
performance.
Other critics of rights-based family law argue that the law should
emphasize parental responsibility, rather than rights.52 Katharine
Bartlett, for example, emphasizing the law's expressive function,
argues that the law should express a "better view of parenthood,"53
one that is grounded in the morality of benevolence and responsi-
bility. In her view, responsibility is inherent in relationship, and
51 See Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their
Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 Fam. L.Q. 233, 237-40
(1986); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 469-72
(1983); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623, 672-74 (1976).
52 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7, at 294-95; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law
and the Pursuit of Intimacy (1993) (arguing for a communitarian framework that
emphasizes responsibility and relationship).
53 Bartlett, supra note 7, at 294.
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describes a connection based on identification.54 Although paren-
tal responsibility is a component of a rights-based conception of
family relationships, it serves primarily as a justification for rights.
As such, the importance of responsibility and other relationship
values is obscured and diminished. 55
In our view, Bartlett correctly identifies parental responsibility
as a core component of a regulatory scheme that will better pro-
mote the interests of children. Although in many regards our anal-
ysis is compatible with communitarian principles, we propose to
explore the issues of parental responsibility through a lens that is
quite different from the more philosophically-based critiques
developed by Bartlett and others. Our relational approach is more
explicitly positive and instrumental in character.5 6 We seek to dis-
cover the means through which a scheme of legal regulation can
best motivate parents to invest the effort necessary to fulfill the
obligations of child-rearing. This inquiry leads to another: to what
extent and through what means does the current regime function
to encourage desired parental behavior?
Even cursory consideration of a relational approach to the pro-
tection of children's interests suggests features that pose challenges
for legal regulation. The scope of the relationship between parents
and children and the range of parenting tasks are very broad.
Parenting places substantial demands on the time, energy and
resources of those who undertake the job, and good parenting
requires giving the role a high priority relative to others in parents'
lives. Inevitably, parents experience conflicts between the claims
54 Id. at 299 (citing Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism 83 (1970)).
55 As Bartlett puts it: "'Having rights' means to be entitled to, to be owed, to have
earned, or to deserve something in exchange for who one is or what one has done." Id. at
298.
56 In applying relational theory to family law, we start with analyses that have
heretofore been focused principally on more explicitly contractual relationships. See, e.g.,
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967 (1983); Goetz & Scott, supra note 3; Robert E.
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005 (1987)
[hereinafter Scott, Conflict and Cooperation]; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986). Some efforts have
been made, however, to apply the principles of relational theory to other, more diverse
contexts. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
Yale L.J. 1909 (1992).
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of parental obligation and other interests that may interfere with
the fulfillment of parental duty. 7 It is in the child's interests that
these conflicts be resolved without sacrificing parental obligation.
Thus, the law's overarching goal is to encourage and reinforce par-
ents' reasonable efforts to fulfill child-rearing duties and to reduce
the conflicts of interest that might lead to shirking of their
responsibilities.
Regulation directed toward this end must be constrained and
shaped by the complexity of the parents' task and by certain quali-
ties of the parent-child relationship. The "performance" of paren-
tal obligation in rearing children to adulthood is extraordinarily
complex and subject to many uncertainties. Numerous contingen-
cies confront parents in making appropriate choices about health
care, safety, nutrition, discipline and education. Narrowly pre-
scribed performance criteria are incompatible with the latitude and
discretion that parenting requires. Moreover, the parent-child
relationship is uniquely intimate, and presumably requires consid-
erable privacy in order to flourish.58 Intrusion by state agents may
impose peculiar costs for this reason. Any legal supervision of par-
ents that seeks to reduce conflicts of interest between parental and
non-parental tasks must be fashioned in a way that does not substi-
tute one set of costs for another.
The task of legal regulation is further complicated by the fact
that parents receive no financial compensation for the care of their
children; indeed, in financial terms, children are a significant drain.
57 These "other interests" can include a broad range of parental preferences and
behaviors that conflict with the child's interest, either because they result directly in harm
to the child (physical abuse, abandonment) or because they contribute to inadequate
fulfillment of parental responsibility. Parents may pursue career advancement instead of
spending time with their children and attending to their needs. They may relieve
frustration by hitting their child, rather than exercising self-restraint. They may spend
money on alcohol or drugs (or cars, clothes, trips or jewelry) instead of on their children's
educational needs. They may satisfy their own personal needs by pursuing extramarital
relationships that threaten family stability and ultimately harm their children. They may
fail to maintain contact with the child when the family dissolves, because new relationships
provide more gratification.
58 This is the thrust of the argument against state intervention in the family made by
psychoanalysts Goldstein et al., supra note 4. The authors argue that undisturbed
development of the parent-child bond is essential to healthy child development, insisting
that state intrusion is "invariably detrimental." See id. at 9. The child has a liberty interest
in privacy and parental autonomy, they argue, which is a part of "family integrity." Id.
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The coin in which parents are paid for their work is the nonpecu-
niary compensation they derive from the role and the relationship.
Thus, legal regulation needs to minimize the impact of intervention
on parental role satisfaction by avoiding unnecessary burdens and
by supporting parents' inherent desires to have and rear children.
In sum, the challenge for family law is to construct a legal appa-
ratus that regulates parental behavior in a complex relational con-
text. The welfare of children and their successful development
hinges to a large extent on adequate performance by parents of
their child-rearing obligations. At least in theory, the law can
encourage parents to act in ways that better serve their children's
interests whenever they otherwise might be inclined to pursue self-
interested goals. The context, however, also suggests that there
will be significant constraints on the types of legal mechanisms that
can safely be deployed to reduce conflicts of interest.
II. REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN PARENT
AND CHILD
The analysis in Part I describes a current of dissatisfaction with
legal regulation of the parent-child relationship and an emerging
sense that the primary objective of state regulation of this relation-
ship should be to advance the interests of children whenever they
conflict with those of their parents. This premise in turn suggests
that family law could usefully employ analogies drawn from the
legal treatment of other relationships similarly subject to substan-
tial conflicts of interest. Because of the asymmetries in informa-
tion-and control between parent and child, fiduciary relationships
seem particularly relevant, and on inspection the relationship
between parent and child shares many features in common with
this category of relationships. Indeed, the fiduciary heuristic seems
to capture the essence of the argument for a legal regime that is
grounded in parental obligation to serve the child's interests.
Fiduciaries in law, such as trustees, corporate directors and man-
agers, guardians, and executors, carry a heightened moral and legal
obligation to serve the interests of a principal/beneficiary, and,
within the scope of the fiduciary relationship, to subordinate their
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own personal interests.5 9 This duty is underscored by a require-
ment of due diligence and unqualified fidelity. 60 In the same vein,
a family law regime premised on a fiduciary framework would
entrust parents with the duty to raise their children to adulthood,
to provide for their physical and psychological needs, and to per-
form the services of parenthood with reasonable diligence and
"undivided loyalty" toward their children's interests.
In many respects, optimal fiduciary behavior as it is described in
other contexts seems quite analogous to the ideal of parenting
advocated by critics of the parental rights approach.6' This analogy
is typically only casually drawn, without any systematic attention to
the implications of treating parents as fiduciaries. Our purpose is
to push the analogy beyond rhetoric.
A. The Structure and Control of Fiduciary Relationships
Fiduciary relationships are a subset of agency relationships, a
broad category of legal relationships in which one party undertakes
to perform a service. for another. A key goal in the regulation of
agency relationships is to encourage the agent to serve her princi-
pal's interests as well as her own. Several characteristics of agency
relationships contribute to the risk of self-interested actions. In
contrast to performance under a simple contingent contract, the
agent's performance is complex and cannot be reduced readily to
specific obligations.62 Satisfactory performance demands consider-
59 In such relationships, where the principal "occupies a position of special confidence,
superiority, or influence, a 'special duty' exists to protect the interest of the other." Goetz
& Scott, supra note 3, at 1127 (citations omitted). As Goetz and Scott note, "Fiduciaries
are required, inter alia, to act 'primarily for the benefit of another, in matters connected
with the undertaking.'" Id. (citing Nagel v. Todd, 45 A.2d 326, 327 (1946) (quoting
Restatement of Agency § 13, cmt. a (1933)); accord Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 51
A.2d 811,813 (Pa. 1947)). For a general discussion of the duties of corporate directors and
managers, see Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, chs. 3-8 (1986). For a discussion of
the trustee's duty of loyalty, see George T. Bogert, Trusts § 95 (6th ed. 1987).
60 Although the obligation of loyalty and "unqualified fidelity" is mandatory, the parties
are free to define by contract the specific duties required of the fiduciary. See Alison Grey
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L.
Rev. 738, 760 (1978).
61 The metaphor of fiduciary responsibility, in different forms, has been used by
commentators to emphasize the importance of parental obligation. See supra note 2.
62 For this reason, Charles Goetz and Robert Scott designate the agent-principal
relationship as a relational contract. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 3.
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able decisionmaking discretion, and monitoring the quality of the
agent's performance may be difficult.
These factors are exaggerated in a fiduciary relationship because
the principal will typically be even less able to control or monitor
the fiduciary's performance than is the case in an ordinary agency
relationship.6 3 The problem may be particularly acute if the princi-
pal/beneficiary is a minor or is mentally disabled. More typically,
beneficiaries-whether shareholders, trust beneficiaries or lega-
tees-are presumed to lack the requisite information or expertise
to understand and evaluate the fiduciary's performance, and
acquiring such information is very costly.64 As a result, not only is
it difficult to monitor the agent's diligence and effort in performing
her assigned responsibilities, but the context carries a heightened
risk of self-dealing as well. In general, the law characterizes as
fiduciary those agency relationships in which the principal is partic-
ularly vulnerable and unable fully to protect and assert his own
interests, thus providing the agent a peculiar opportunity and
incentive either to shirk or cheat.65
Fiduciary law seeks to change these incentives through mecha-
nisms designed to encourage actors to pursue collective rather than
personal goals. Legal duties of fiduciaries fall roughly into two cat-
egories: a duty of care-the agent must perform her responsibili-
ties with reasonable diligence-and a duty of loyalty-the
fiduciary must not place her personal interests above those of her
principal.66 The objective, in either case, is first to encourage the
63 Robert Clark argues that fiduciaries are different from typical agents, because
principals control agents and are ready to countermand their agents' decisions. See Robert
C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of
Business 55, 56-59 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). In our view,
fiduciary relationships should be treated as a subset of agency relationships which have
many agency characteristics in exaggerated form.
64 This is often true of trust beneficiaries and shareholders. Alison Anderson discusses
the costs to shareholders of acquiring information, each of whom has a small stake in the
corporation, and thus may not be motivated to. invest enough to acquire adequate
information. See Anderson, supra note 60, at 778-80; accord Clark, supra note 63, at 77.
65 See supra note 3.
66 In Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944), the court made this distinction very
clear:
The fiduciary has two paramount obligations: responsibility and loyalty. . . .The
responsibility-that is, the care and the diligence-required of an agent or of a
fiduciary, is proportioned to the occasion. It is a concept that has, and necessarily
so, a wide penumbra of meaning ....
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fiduciary to take the beneficiary's interests properly into account in
making decisions, and second to facilitate detection of her failure
to do so.
The means used to achieve the desired goals include both extra-
legal mechanisms (primarily informal social norms) and legal
devices, and are usefully grouped into two broad categories. Moni-
toring arrangements allow the principal to supervise the agent's
actions so as to detect and sanction agent conduct in pursuit of
selfish ends. 67 Bonding arrangements align the interest of the
agent with that of the principal through self-limiting -constraints
that serve a precommitment function.68  Bonding mechanisms,
although they constrain agent behavior, will be as desired by agents
as by principals to the extent that they substitute for even more
costly monitoring efforts. 69 In contractual agency relationships, for
example, agents voluntarily accept the imposition of sanctions
upon default, thus providing assurance to principals that they will
not act contrary to the principals' ends.7 ° In fiduciary relationships,
legal and extralegal limits on fiduciary conduct serve an analogous
bonding function, defining the role in a way that constrains the
fiduciary's future conduct through threat of sanction in the event of
default.
From an efficiency perspective, the goal of legal regulation of
fiduciaries (and other agents) is to reduce conflicts of interest (situ-
ations that compromise either the agent's diligent performance or
loyalty, or both) at the least cost. In service of this goal, extralegal
The concept of loyalty, of constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise
meaning. The fiduciary must subordinate his individual and private interests to his
duty ... whenever the two conflict.
Id. at 5, cited in Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1127 n.86.
67 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 308.
68 Id.
69 Jensen & Meckling established the reciprocal relationship between bonding and
monitoring functions. Through bonding, the agent guarantees that she will not take certain
actions which would harm the principal or ensures that the principal will be compensated if
she does take such actions. Ex ante, these precommitments benefit the agent as well as the
principal to the extent that they increase the value of the performance being provided. The
enhanced performance is reflected in a higher price paid to the agent for her services.
Thus, self-limiting constraints will be voluntarily assumed whenever these precommitments
can substitute for more costly monitoring alternatives. See id. at 323-26.
70 It is useful to think of bonding mechanisms as precommitments that will encourage
the agent to pursue the collective long-term interest at times when her short-term interest
diverges from the cooperative goal. Id.
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and legal mechanisms are substitutes for one another, as are bond-
ing and monitoring devices. Thus, where informal social norms
exert a powerful influence on agents' behavior, less extensive legal
mechanisms are required.7' Similarly, insofar as the fiduciary is
adequately "bonded" (i.e., she sees her interests as allied with that
of the beneficiary), the principal's need to monitor the fiduciary's
performance is reduced. Consequently, the optimal scheme of reg-
ulation (specifically, the best combination of extralegal and legal
incentives and of bonding and monitoring mechanisms) will vary
depending on the circumstances and the particular context.
The prohibition against self-dealing, a feature common to the
regulation of fiduciaries, is a particularly appropriate illustration of
the variable nature of legal regulation. This proscription functions
to define a boundary of fiduciary discretion, and it varies in its
strictness in different settings. In trust law, the prohibition is abso-
lute; trustees cannot engage in self-dealing, however reasonable
the transaction.72 The beneficiaries can rescind any transaction
between the trustee and the trust, and require the trustee to dis-
gorge profits.73 The duty of corporate managers and directors,
however, is less stringent. A corporate director who enters into a
contract with the corporation must demonstrate that the deal is fair
to the corporation, in the sense that the transaction is as advanta-
geous to the corporation as a comparable transaction in a competi-
tive market.74
71 Stewart Macaulay relates the comment of one businessman:
"[I]f something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the
problem. You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to
do business again." As an example of how well established this attitude is, Macaulay
tells of the large manufacturer of packaging materials who inspected its records and
found that it had failed to create legally binding contracts in two-thirds of the orders
randomly selected for review.
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 56, at 2047-48 (citations omitted) (quoting and
citing Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 60-61 (1963)).
72 Self-dealing is implicated any time the trustee, as trustee, bargains with himself in an
individual capacity. It occurs any time the trustee sells his own property to the trust or
buys trust property. See Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and
Estates 851-52 (4th ed. 1990).
73 Id. at 852.
74 Clark, supra note 63, at 73-74; see also American Law Institute, Principles of
Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations § 5.02 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1986) (covering transactions by directors and officers for a corporation), cited
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The self-limiting constraint is more stringent as applied to trust-
ees then to corporate fiduciaries in part because, as a class, trust
beneficiaries have less control7 5 and are more vulnerable 76 than are
shareholders. For these reasons, trustees may face a greater oppor-
tunity and temptation to cheat than corporate fiduciaries, and thus
require greater levels of deterrence and constraint. But perhaps
more importantly, the more stringent rules that apply to trustees
generally reflect the more limited purpose and scope of the trust
relationship. In contrast to trustees, corporate directors are
engaged in a broad range of activities on behalf of the corporation.
Broader discretion and a presumption of good faith and diligence
are justified in the corporate context by the broad scope of the
agency relationship as well as the importance of encouraging direc-
tors willingly to invest effort in service of the shareholders.
In corporate law, the presumption of due diligence is embodied
in the business judgment rule, "a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
in William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporations 591 (6th ed. 1988); Clark, supra
note 59, § 5.2 (describing three conditions for the validity of self-dealing transactions
involving directors or officers of a corporation). For example, if the corporate president
happens to own a gravel pit and sells gravel to the corporation at above niarket price, the
shareholders can rescind the deal or collect damages. As Clark explains, this response is
part of a general scheme of rules prohibiting the corporate director/manager from using
her positional advantage to the detriment of the corporation. These include prohibitions
against corporate directors and managers developing corporate opportunities unless the
corporation is unable to do so. See Clark, supra note 63, at 74-75. The prohibition against
insider-trading was originally imposed under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 on the ground that insider trading was wrong. See Henry 0. Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market 8-10 (1966). Some argue that the insider-trading ban
is valuable because it reinforces confidence in the stock market among third parties and
avoids the appearance of conflict of interest. If the majority of potential investors fear the
market is unfair, they will refrain from investing, leaving the market undercapitalized. See
Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1440-42 (1967).
75 Trust beneficiaries cannot terminate the relationship with the trustee, unlike
shareholders, who can vote to terminate directors. See William L. Cary & Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporations 205-07 (6th ed. 1988); Clark, supra note 59, § 3.1.1.
76 Among multiple shareholders in a corporation, some are likely to be inclined to
monitor managerial behavior even if most are not. A given trust will usually have one or a
small number of beneficiaries, who may be minors or otherwise incapable of monitoring.
Thus, the potential for abuse of power by fiduciaries may be greater in the latter situation.
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action taken was in the best interests of the company. '' 77 The
actions and judgments of corporate directors are not protected by
the business judgment rule, however, when the judgment in ques-
tion was tainted by a conflict of interest 78 or by gross negligence.79
In sum, the business judgment rule assumes that the decision in
question reflects reasonable diligence and care, but evidence of a
violation of the duty of care (negligence) or of the duty of loyalty
(self-dealing) will trigger sanctions. The business judgment rule
represents an implicit recognition that the more complex and
broad ranging is the fiduciary relationship, the more discretion is
needed and the more legal norms must be selectively deployed in
concert with other informal arrangements that also align the inter-
ests of the parties.
1. Bonding Arrangements
The legal rules that support the duties of care and loyalty serve
both bonding and monitoring functions. Given the costs of
enforcement, however, the bonding function dominates. Bonding
restrictions function principally as precommitments; they are
undertaken by the fiduciary with the purpose of limiting her future
actions in a way that reduces the incidence of conflicts of interest.80
1 77 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430.A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (holding that the business judgment rule is a
presumption of good faith and due diligence that requires deference to the expertise of
corporate directors); American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations § 4.01(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1992) ("A director or
officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty under this Section
[titled Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business Judgment Rule] if the director
or officer: (1) is not interested ... (2) is informed ... (3) rationally believes that the
business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation."); Clark, supra note 59, § 3.4
(summarizing the business judgment rule).
78 See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
79 See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prod. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 420 (6th Cir. 1981).
80 A decisionmaker, wanting to follow a chosen course of action, and fearing that in the
future she may be tempted to make choices that are inconsistent with that course, may
precommit by taking present actions that make it more difficult in the future to depart
from the chosen course. For a discussion of precommitment theory in various legal
contexts, see Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An
Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices,
59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 329, 342-47 (1986); Scott, supra note 48, at 40-42. For discussions of
precommitment theory generally, see R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic
Utility Maximization, 23 Rev. Econ. Stud. 165 (1955-56) (the pilot work in the field);
George Ainslie, Behavioral Economics II: Motivated, Involuntary Behavior, 23 Soc. Sci.
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On the margin, the fiduciary will internalize the prohibition and
avoid conduct that increases the risk of self-interested actions.
Toward this end, fiduciary law explicitly uses informal social norms
to influence fiduciary behavior in ways that reduce conflicts of
interest. By establishing a standard of performance that empha-
sizes heightened obligations of loyalty and integrity, and by the use
of hortatory moral rhetoric, the law invokes a personal sense of
moral obligation in the performance of fiduciary duty.8' As Robert
Clark observes, courts talk about fiduciary duty in a tone that con-
trasts sharply with that which is used to describe obligation in com-
mercial contractual relationships.8 The stance of moral neutrality
that courts adopt toward efficient breach in other contexts is absent
here; fiduciary default is treated as a moral violation with attendant
reputational costs.8 3 This invocation of morality may compensate
partially for the ineffectiveness of market controls in this context,
since beneficiaries are presumed less able to protect their interests
than are parties in ordinary commercial relationships.84 In any
Info. 47, 54-56 (1984); George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of
Impulsiveness and Impulse Control, 82 Psychol. Bull. 463, 476-89 (1975); Thomas C.
Schelling, Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers &
Proc.) 290 (1978); Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in
Choice and Consequence 83 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in
Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 1 (1984).
81 Justice Cardozo described fiduciary duty in the following terms:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty .... Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
82 Clark, supra note 63, at 75-76.
83 Id. The importance of reputational costs and benefits in shaping behavior according
to moral prescriptions has been examined in the context of marital and family behavior in
Amy L. Wax, Review Essay: Against Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at Part 11.1, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
84 As Clark points out, a breach of contract is likely to be sanctioned, because the
obligee will know of the breach and may seek a remedy. In contrast, moral disapproval is
needed in the fiduciary context because ordinary market and legal controls are less
effective, either because beneficiaries lack information or because they are incompetent.See Clark, supra note 63, at 78-79.
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event, the rhetoric of fiduciary duty is a strong signal that this rela-
tionship does not involve "business as usual." The fiduciary who is
tempted to defect faces the informal social costs of guilt and moral
opprobrium as well as others that the law might impose.
The tradition, often endorsed by law, of appointing family mem-
bers as fiduciaries is another example of a bonding mechanism that
reinforces, extralegal norms.8 5 Family members are often chosen as
trustees, executors, or guardians and as managers in close corpora-
tions, because it is assumed that they will be more likely to identify
their interests with the interests of their principals, and will be less
likely to abuse their discretion. The informal cultural norms of
family loyalty reinforce legal standards, thereby encouraging self-
limiting behavior by the fiduciary. The family fiduciary anticipates
costs of humiliation and social disapproval upon default that
exceed those experienced by non-family fiduciaries. These costs
may discourage self-interested behavior.
The rhetoric of obligation that characterizes the fiduciary rela-
tionship is directed principally toward reducing the heightened risk
of disloyalty. Thus, as Robert Scott and Charles Goetz have
shown, the extraordinary obligations of fiduciary performance are
obligations of loyalty and integrity, rather than requirements of
extraordinary effort in pursuit of collective purposes.8 6 Fiduciaries
are not obliged to attend to their fiduciary duties to the exclusion
of other personal obligations and activities. Scott and Goetz argue
that the degree of care and effort required of a fiduciary in advanc-
ing the principal's interests is analogous to that required in other
agency relationships-an amount of diligence and effort that maxi-
mizes the joint utility of beneficiary and fiduciary.87
85 See Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act §§ 2-205, 2-309, 8A
U.L.A. 439, 489-90, 509-10 (1982) (establishing priority for appointment of family
members as guardian and conservator, respectively). This mechanism is not suitable, of
course, for the setting of the public corporation, where there are multiple "beneficiaries."
86 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1126-30. In corporate law, however, sometimes
the line is ambiguous between duty of loyalty on the one hand and duty of care on the
other.
87 Id. at 1128-29. The joint maximization hypothesis follows from the reciprocal nature
of contractual relationships. Parties enter into contractual relationships in order to pursue
individual ends through collective action. The greater the benefits that can be gained from
their contractual venture, the greater the individual benefits for each contracting partner,
ceteris paribus. An assumption that the degree of effort required of a fiduciary or other
agent is that necessary to maximize the joint interests of the parties thus provides the most
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2. Monitoring Mechanisms
The beneficiary in a fiduciary relationship is generally less well-
positioned to monitor the agent's behavior than is the principal in a
typical contractual agency relationship.88 As a consequence,
legally prescribed and supervised oversight plays a larger role in
monitoring fiduciary conduct. Trustees, guardians and executors
are subject to elaborate, judicially supervised reporting require-
ments obliging them to disclose their activities as fiduciaries, and
some fiduciary decisions are subject to court approval.8 9 Corporate
fiduciaries are legally obliged to report to shareholders; 90 they are
rational default rule for specifying standards of performance in the absence of specifically
agreed upon alternatives. Id. at 1126-30. Moreover, the joint maximization crit&ion
subsumes other plausible alternatives such as a standard of reasonable diligence and care,
since any effort that maximizes the joint product will, by definition, be the effort required
of a reasonably prudent agent.
The joint maximization criterion also fits comfortably within the rhetorical tradition of
fiduciary law. Such a standard requires the fiduciary to treat the principal's interests fairly,
taking both parties' interests into account when determining the appropriate amount of
effort to devote to collective as opposed to individual tasks.
Although the joint maximization criterion functions primarily as a default rule in
contractual agency relationships, the logic that underlies the criterion would be equally
compelling in determining mandatory standards of performance for other fiduciary
relationships, including those where the contractual relationship runs from the settlor or
the state to the fiduciary insofar as the state or settlor undertook to establish the
relationship to advance the interests of the beneficiary.
88 The creator of the fiduciary relationship (the settlor of a trust, for example) can
sometimes monitor the fiduciary's performance. This may be difficult for a trustee,
however, and impossible for a testator. Of course, in a guardianship, the state as creator of
the guardianship monitors through judicial supervision.
89 See, e.g., Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, §§ 2-109, 2-209,
2-317-18. Guardians, under some statutes, must seek court approval for extraordinary
medical treatment such as psychiatric hospitalization, or sterilization of minors or the
mentally impaired. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-49-202 (Michie 1991); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 45a-698 (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-3018(g)(8) (1994); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-
36, 35-37 (1990). Some states require court approval for guardians to sell stock or real
estate of their minor wards. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 29-2-5, 29-2-6 (Michie 1993).
90 For example, under the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Securities Exchange Commission requires registered corporations to send an annual report
to shareholders along with proxies. The report must include audited balance sheets for the
last two fiscal years, information concerning disagreements with accountants or changes in
accountants, management's analysis of the corporation's financial condition and the result
of corporate operations, the identity of all directors and executive officers, as well as other
information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1995). Many states have similar provisions.
California, for example, requires that an annual report containing a balance sheet and
income statement for the past fiscal year be sent to shareholders 15 days prior to annual
meetings. See Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 1501(a) (West 1990). Other states merely give
Virginia Law Review
also subject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.91
An important means of controlling misbehavior in most agency
relationships is the principal's right to terminate the relationship or
to replace the agent.92 In many fiduciary relationships, however,
this right is either not available to or is not easily exercised by
beneficiaries.93 The choice of fiduciary is controlled by the party
who creates the relationship, who in many contexts is not the bene-
ficiary.94 Corporate shareholders have the power to remove direc-
tors and (indirectly) managers, but in many other fiduciary
relationships this power can only be exercised by a court unless
otherwise provided by the party creating the relationship. 95 Courts
shareholders a right to inspect corporate records upon written request. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law Ann. § 624 (McKinney 1986).
91 Publicly-held corporations are subject to periodic reporting requirements imposed
under the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They must file annual 10-K
forms, quarterly 10-Q forms, and 8-K forms when certain events occur. 10-K forms must
be filed within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year and must include, inter alia, information
on the corporation's financial condition and general business development, disclosures on
legal proceedings against the corporation, executive compensation, and conflict of interest
transactions. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.15d-1, 249.310 (1995). For a copy of form 10-
K, see Research Institute of America, 4 Securities Regulation J 13,139 (1993). Form 10-Q
reports must be filed within 45 days of the end of the quarter, except for the fourth quarter.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13, 249.308a (1995). They must include a quarterly
financial report, a management report, and disclosures on legal proceedings and defaults
on senior securities, as well as other requirements. For a copy of form 10-Q, see Research
Institute of America, 4 Securities Regulation 13,141 (1993). A form 8-K must be filed
within 15 days of a change in corporate control, if the corporation experiences a major
change in assets (beyond the ordinary course of business), or if there is a change of
accountants. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-11, 240.15d-11 (1995); For a copy of Form 8-K, see
Research Institute of America, 4 Securities Regulation 13,133 (1993). See generally J.
Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 741 (1985) (analyzing corporate disclosure duties). States also have their
own reporting requirements. See Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 75, at 269-70.
92 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1130-49.
93 Termination of the fiduciary relationship (such as the dissolution of a trust) and
replacement of one fiduciary with another are, of course, different acts.
94 Moreover, in trusts and wills, the settlor and testator are often not available.
95 Compare Clark, supra note 59, § 3.1.1 (noting conditions under which corporate
shareholders may remove directors), with Bogert, supra note 59, § 160, at 573-74 (noting
conditions under which courts may remove trustees, including, inter alia, insanity, habitual
drunkeness, extreme improvidence, conviction of a crime, insolvency, bankruptcy, failure
or refusal to act, mingling of trust property with the trustee's individual property, failure to
account, conflict of interest, and failure to cooperate with co-trustees). The court has
considerable power with respect to trustees:
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generally have broad discretion to remove and replace fiduciaries
who misbehave.9 6 Courts exercising this power typically assume
that substituting a new fiduciary imposes only minimal costs on the
beneficiary and that fiduciaries themselves have little direct inter-
est (other than loss of income) at stake in the relationship.97
3. Rewards of the Fiduciary Role
If the relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary is struc-
tured primarily to serve the interests of the beneficiary, why would
the role of fiduciary have any appeal? To be sure, some fiduciaries
may be altruistic, or motivated by a preexisting sense of duty
toward a particular beneficiary, perhaps because of a family rela-
tionship. Fiduciaries also receive financial compensation for their
work, and in some professions involving fiduciary obligation the
compensation is generous. Another important component of role
satisfaction for many fiduciaries is reputational reward and correla-
tive self-esteem. The role of trustee, for example, invokes respect
in the community, signaling that the individual has assumed an
important responsibility, and is trustworthy and morally upright.
Community recognition of these attributes carries its own reward,
enhancing the nonpecuniary value of the fiduciary role.
In sum, through a scheme of formal and informal bonding and
monitoring mechanisms, the fiduciary is encouraged to subordinate
self-interest in carrying out her responsibilities and to devote
appropriate efforts toward furthering the beneficiary's interests.
If a beneficiary can prove that his financial interests will be seriously endangered
by a continued operation of the trust by the trustee, he may be able to secure the
trustee's removal by a court of equity.
The court has power to remove a trustee and to appoint a successor trustee.
Id. at 571.
96 See, e.g., Hines v. Brown's Comm., 88 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ky. Ct. App. 1935); Uniform
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, §§ 2-112, 2-211; George G. Bogert &
George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 527, at 49 & n.3, 52 & n.7 (Rev. 2d ed.
1993) (citing statutes).
97 Some courts do acknowledge that the fiduciary has a reputational interest at stake in
a removal proceeding. See, e.g., IFS Indus., Inc. v. Stephens, 205 Cal. Rptr. 915, 925-26
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Heizer Corp. v. Hackbarth, Civ. A. No. 7949, 1988 WL 58272, at *2
(Del. Ch. 1988); In re Estate of Georgiana, 458 A.2d 989, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Dahl v.
Akin, 645 S.W.2d 506, 520 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); see also Bogert, supra note 59, § 160, at
571 (noting that reputational costs deter courts from removal of trustees).
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These responsibilities are induced by a quid pro quo: compensation
that includes, in addition to financial rewards, broad grants of
authority and discretion that enhance reputation and self-esteem.
B. A Relational Model of Parents as Fiduciaries
1. In General
The relationship between parent and child invites comparison to
legal fiduciary relationships and poses similar challenges for legal
regulation. It is apparent at the outset, however, that applying a
fiduciary framework to the parent-child relationship requires
accommodation of some peculiar features that distinguish this rela-
tionship from many others in the fiduciary category. Given the
extensive scope of the relationship, a prescription that parents
must systematically subordinate their personal interest to that of
the child when the two are in conflict seems unduly burdensome,
and ultimately likely to deter prospective parents from taking on
the role. Furthermore, enforcement of such an obligation,
although theoretically feasible, would require costly and intrusive
state supervision of intact families. This effect seems particularly
troublesome given the intimacy of the relationship and the pre-
sumed importance of privacy to optimal family functioning. More-
over, the substantial costs to children of replacing parents and of
severing the filial bond inhibits the imposition of a sanction that is
used to discipline fiduciaries in other contexts.98
Thus, a model scheme for regulating the parent-child relation-
ship must attend to the unique features of this familial bond, and
some adaptation of the conventional regulatory mechanisms is
required. The usefulness of this approach is not diminished by
these constraints, however, so long as policymakers appreciate the
goals of regulation and evaluate legal rules as means to the pre-
scribed ends. Optimal rules that seek to motivate parents to act so
as to promote their children's welfare and to encourage parental
commitment to the relationship will necessarily weigh the burdens
that are placed on parents and the costs of disrupting the relation-
ship. To ignore these costs is counterproductive, and, by definition,
suboptimal. Because parents are not fungible actors in their chil-
98 See supra note 4.
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dren's lives, and because parents' enthusiasm for their role can be
assumed to affect their children's welfare, protecting the child's
interest requires particular attention to the effects of regulation on
parental satisfaction and commitment. As in all other relationships
that are similarly regulated, rules that reduce conflicts of interest
and self-dealing are shaped by the character of the relationship
being regulated.
Although the parent-child relationship is formally derived from
status, its salient characteristics suggest that the relationship is
most closely analogous to contract-based agency relationships that
carry fiduciary obligations, such as the duties of corporate directors
to their shareholders. The role of parents, like that of corporate
directors, involves a performance that includes an extensive range
of decisions and tasks. Like corporate directors, parents are
granted broad discretion in making decisions that affect the inter-
ests of their principals. Moreover, as is true in the family context,
the ultimate goal of maximizing shareholder value is served by
encouraging directors to invest substantial efforts in performing
their duties. Many of the rules governing corporate directors-
such as the business judgment rule-implicitly recognize the feed-
back effects between role satisfaction and performance.
2. A Relational Model of the Intact Family
At the outset, we make several fundamental assumptions about
state regulation of the parent-child relationship. First, we assume
that the overarching purpose of the state is to protect the interests
of children in receiving from their parents the care and nurture
necessary to enable them to develop into healthy adults. Second,
we assume that parents function as "first best" caretakers and are
preferred to state agents, ceteris paribus. Finally, we assume that a
substantial motivation leading parents to procreate is the anticipa-
tion of rearing their children in a family unit. Taken together,
these assumptions imply that the state, in specifying an optimal
scheme of regulation, must attend to the interests of parents in
having and rearing children.
One method of analyzing the interplay among these basic
assumptions is to imagine a hypothetical negotiation between the
state and parents over the appropriate standards of parental
responsibility. The state's interest is to achieve its stated goals.
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The parents' interest-is to maximize the returns from parenthood.
We then ask what combination of regulatory provisions would be
agreed to by the state and the broadest number of parents engaged
in such a bargaining process.99 In the context of the intact family,
both extralegal forces and legal bonding arrangements emerge as
attractive candidates.
a. Extralegal Influences: Biological and Affective Bonds and
Social Norms
In analyzing the appropriate role that extralegal forces play in
encouraging parents to act in their children's interest, we assume
that having children represents a voluntary choice on the part of
parents, 10 but that in rearing children parents must fulfill the fun-
damental objective of the state: to provide the care and nurture
necessary for children to develop into healthy, functioning adults.
Given this assumption, it follows that social norms and other influ-
ences that bond parents to their parental obligations serve the
interests of both parents and the state. The state's interest is to
achieve its objective at least cost, and thus it would always agree to
substitute a less costly extralegal arrangement for more costly state
supervision 01 Similarly, parents would accept self-limiting con-
99 Some readers have objected to the use of a contractual model that characterizes
parents as agents of the state in the rearing of their children. Stephen Sugarman challenges
this characterization, arguing that the agency model does not capture the understanding of
the parental role shared by most people. Parents, unlike other fiduciaries, are free to do as
they want with their children (above some minimum level of care). Letter from Stephen
Sugarman to authors (Mar. 6, 1995) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
We are sympathetic to the discomfort that the relational model may cause. However, a
model is not tested by how accurately it captures real world experience-which no model
purports to do. Rather, the validity of a model turns on how well it predicts results. We
believe that the agency model explains much of the peculiar design of the legal regulation
of the state-parent relationship. If anything, the relational model exaggerates parental
autonomy and deemphasizes the authority of the state to dictate standards of parental
performance. As our analysis shows; the freedom of parents to make decisions about
child-rearing free of state intrusion (which, as Sugarman observes, distinguishes the
parental role from other fiduciary relationships) is entirely consistent with the relational
model.
100 This assumption may be counterfactual in some instances, of course. It is generally
sound, however, given that it is relatively easy to avoid having unwanted children.
101 It is important to remember that the cost of any regulatory mechanism is the sum of
two types of costs: the direct costs of enforcement and the "error" costs of a failure to
control perfectly the behavior subject to regulation. Thus, a given arrangement is cost-
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straints that deter selfish behavior whenever these constraints can
substitute for more onerous state controls on child-rearing.
The biological and affective bonds between parents and children
together with informal social norms encourage parents to identify
their interests with those of their children and to approach their
performance as parents with a sense of moral obligation. In such
an environment, parents would expect to experience the rewards of
social approval and self-fulfillment for good parenting, and would
expect both guilt and social opprobrium to follow default. Indeed,
in contrast to other fiduciary contexts where the invocation of
morality as a means of influencing fiduciary behavior is largely a
legal construction, in the family setting these extralegal factors
function independently of the law to influence parental behavior.
Research and other evidence suggests that most parents are influ-
enced to a greater or lesser degree by biological, psychological and
social forces which, in combination, generate a norm of parental
obligation. 10 2
The most controversial strand of this complex bond is biological.
Scholars representing very diverse perspectives and ideologies
have emphasized the importance of the biological bond between
parents and children as an influence on parental behavior. 0 3 Evo-
lutionary psychologists argue that biological parenthood inclines
effective when the sum of enforcement and error costs is less than the total cost of any
available alternative.
102 See infra text accompanying notes 103-13 for discussion of the relevant research.
103 As discussed in the text and notes below, evolutionary psychologists and
sociobiologists most prominently argue for the importance of biology. See infra notes 104-
06 and accompanying text. Legal scholars, such as Richard Epstein, have advocated the
importance of sociobiology. See Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DePaul L.
Rev. 981 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Authoritarian Impulse in Sex Discrimination
Law: A Reply to Professors Abrams and Strauss, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 1041 (1992); Richard
A. Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist Thought, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 331 (1995).
Moreover, feminist legal scholars such as Robin West, Mary Anne Case, and Martha
Fineman also have focused on the importance of the biological bond between parent and
child. West argues that women's identities are importantly shaped by the experience of
connection in pregnancy and birth. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1 (1988). Case, in an entertaining and provocative response to the enthusiastic
endorsement of sociobiology by Richard Epstein, suggests that if law sought to embrace
the lessons of sociobiology, it would protect the mother-child dyad rather than the tenuous
marital bond. See Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 369 (1995). Case bases this argument on Martha Fineman's thesis
that the mother-child dyad should be legally protected as the core family relationship. See
Martha ineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century
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parents to protect and care for their children.1°4 By this account,
parents nurture their young (and have little inclination to nurture
the children of others) in order to protect their genetic heritage
and maximize its survival.10 5 Researchers point to the much lower
rates of violence directed toward biological children than toward
stepchildren and non-biological family members as evidence of this
biological incination. 1°6
Less debatable is the powerful affective bond between parent
and child. At the birth of their child, parents undertake a long-
term relationship which usually builds incrementally and involves a
deep emotional attachment. This relationship is distinctive among
others characterized by emotional attachment, constituting what
social psychologists describe as a "crescive bond," which links irre-
placeable individuals into a continuing relationship. 10 7 For these
bonds to form, the relationship must be an important component
of the parents' personal and social identity and must provide
rewards, particularly self-esteem. Research suggests that the role
of parent is among the most important in defining personal identity
for both men and women.10 8
The affective bond provides powerful grounding for a parental
precommitment to care for the welfare of one's children. The force
of that commitment does not, however, derive solely from the
Tragedies (1995). Fineman does not argue for rights based on biology per se, but on
nurturing (a function usually fulfilled by mothers).
104 See Margo Wilson, Impact of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U.
Toronto Faculty L. Rev. 216, 222-24 (1987); see also Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child
Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living with Both Parents, 6 Ethology & Sociobiology 197
(1985) (concluding that children living with one natural parent and one stepparent are
dramatically more likely to suffer child abuse than those living with both natural parents);
Joy L. Lightcap, Jeffrey A. Kurland & Robert L. Burgess, Child Abuse: A Test of Some
Predictions from Evolutionary Theory, 3 Ethology & Sociobiology 61 (1982) (concluding
that lack of genetic relationship makes "parent" more likely to neglect or abuse child).
105 See Daly & Wilson, supra note 104, at 197; Lightcap et al., supra note 104, at 62;
Wilson, supra note 104, at 222-24.
106 See Daly & Wilson, supra note 104, at 205; Lightcap et al., supra note 104, at 64-66.
107 See Ralph H. Turner, Family Interaction 80 (1970). For a discussion of the parent-
child relationship as a crescive bond, see Lynn White, Step Families Over the Life Course:
Social Support 4-5 (paper presented at National Symposium on Stepfamilies, Pennsylvania
State University, Oct. 14-15, 1993) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
108 See White, supra note 107, at 4-5. White notes that the role of stepparent is much
less salient. Recent research has found the role of parent to be the most salient role. Id.
(citing-Peggy A. Thoits, Identity Structures and Psychological Well-Being: Gender and
Marital Status Comparisons, 55 Soc. Psych. Q. 236 (1992)).
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existence of a strong affective bond.1' 9 Informal social norms play
an important part in shaping parents' recognition that their role is
defined by serious obligation and subordinated self-interest. Cer-
tainly, much of the rhetoric about parenthood in contemporary cul-
ture reinforces this sense of obligation, and anecdotal evidence
suggests that the message is getting stronger.110 Several examples
make the point. First, public concern about child abuse and neglect
has increased in the past generation. Predictable reactions of out-
rage follow egregious examples of parental misconduct"' and self-
interested behavior.112  Second, popular media attention has
focused on the harmful psychological and economic impact of
divorce on children, and negative publicity about "deadbeat dads"
has been translated into tough child support enforcement legisla-
tion.1 3 Examples of fathers going to jail or losing professional
109 The fact that the parent-child relationship is of identity-defining importance to the
parent does not mean, necessarily, that parents will understand their role as shaped
principally by obligation. The role could also include a sense of entitlement.
110 A theme of popular psychology in the 1970s and 1980s was that "parents are people,
too" and should not feel guilty about pursuing their own interest. Carl Schneider discusses
the "rise of psychologic man" as a modem cultural phenomenon in which personal
fulfillment and self realization are emphasized. See Schneider, supra note 30, at 1852-60.
The enthusiasm for this attitude seems to have waned in recent years, however, perhaps
because of concern about the impact of widespread divorce on children and the growing
focus on child abuse. See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
111 The cases of Susan Smith, Joshua DeShaney, and Joel and Lisa Steinberg are good
examples. Susan Smith drowned her two sons in South Carolina in 1994. Bill Hewitt,
Tears of Hate, Tears of Pity, People, Mar. 13, 1995, at 76. A national poll revealed that
50% of the public supported her execution for the crime. Id. at 78. Joshua DeShaney was
beaten so badly by his father that he will spend the rest of his life in a home for the
severely retarded. Most public outrage was focused on the U.S. Supreme Court for not
allowing Joshua's mother to sue the social services department that failed to remove
Joshua from the custody of his father, her former husband. "'Poor Joshua!," Time, Mar. 6,
1989, at 56; Cold Comfort and a Beaten Child, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, at E22. Joel
Steinberg beat his illegally adopted six-year-old daughter to death. See supra note 31.
Even fellow inmates wanted to kill Steinberg. Steinberg, Citing Fear, Misses Court
Hearing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at B5.
112 A good example is the public outrage that followed an episode in which two parents
left two small children home alone for several days over Christmas while they went to
Acapulco. See supra note 46.
113 For examples of popular media articles on the effect of divorce on children, see
Barbara Kantrowitz, Breaking the Divorce Cycle, Newsweek, Jan. 13, 1992, at 48; Jennet
Conant, You'd Better Sit Down, Kids, Newsweek, Aug. 24, 1987,'at 58; Aric Press, Divorce
American Style, Newsweek, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42.
For examples of popular media articles on deadbeat dads, see David van Biema,
Dunning Deadbeats, Time, Apr. 3, 1995, at 49; Joe Klein, 'Make the Daddies Pay',
Virginia Law Review
licenses for failure to pay child support underscore the lesson that
parental default is a moral, as well as a legal, violation.1 4 Thus, as
is true with other fiduciary relationships, these informal norms can
be invoked to reinforce the commitment by parents to limit their
future behavior in ways that will serve their children's interest.
The pervasive force of these extralegal influences in shaping
parental attitudes distinguishes the parent-child relationship from
other fiduciary bonds."15 The utility of parents' affective bonds and
informal social norms in promoting desirable behavior reduces
substantially the role for formal legal incentives in mitigating con-
flicts of interest. Moreover, extralegal norms impose much lower
costs on both the state's and parents' interests in procreation and
Newsweek, June 21, 1993, at 33; Steven Waldman, Deadbeat Dads, Newsweek, May 4,
1992, at 46.
In recent years, Congress has sought to promote enforcement of child support through
tougher legislation, including the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988)); the Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 ) (mandating automatic
withholding by employers of legally due child support payments); and the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994))
(authorizing interstate imposition of fines and imprisonment for non-payment). In March
of 1995, the House passed H.R. 4, the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995. Title VII, Child
Support, requires state child support agencies to maintain automated child support
registries, requires employers to provide information on all newly-hired employees to a
central registry and provides for civil penalties for employers that fail to comly, authorizes
and encourages states to suspend driver's and professional licenses of parents in default,
provides for withholding of wages to satisfy delinquent child support obligations, and
expands the authority of the Federal Parent Locator Service. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
State legislatures have also been active. In January 1994, Massachusetts Governor
William Weld signed legislation giving the state the power to jail defaulting parents or to
revoke their driver's or professional licenses. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119A, § 16
(West Supp. 1995).
The direction of legal reform regarding parental obligation runs counter to the dominant
ethos of moral neutrality in contemporary family law. See Schneider, supra note 30, at
1812.
114 See Peter J. Howe, New 'Deadbeat Dad' Law, Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1994, at 18
(summarizing provisions of the Massachusetts law). Several fathers have been jailed or
have lost their professional licenses for failure to pay child support under this new law. See
Andrea Estes, DOR Nabs 3 Deadbeat Dads Owing $200G Out of State, Boston Herald,
June 2, 1994, at 11; Doris Sue Wong, State Pulls Job Licenses of 'Deadbeat' Fathers,
Boston Globe, May 19, 1995, at 51.
115 As we noted, in other settings the informal norms themselves are largely legal
constructions, generated from judicial and other legal descriptions of the fiduciary bond.
See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. Moreover, other fiduciary relationships
often do not involve the biological and affective components of the parental bond.
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child-rearing. These norms are low-cost/high-benefit instruments
for reducing the incidence of self-interested behavior by parents
and thus function as substitutes for more intrusive and costly legal
constraints. 16
b. Legal Bonding Arrangements: Conflict of Interest Rules
As we suggested above, the dominant function of conflict of
interest rules in fiduciary law is to induce self-limiting behavior by
the fiduciary. In the family context, however, blanket rules against
self-dealing analogous to those applied to trustees and executors
would impose much greater demoralization costs on parents and
would undermine the interests of both the state and parents in pro-
moting procreation and child-rearing activity.117 Parents' and chil-
dren's interests are extensively intertwined, and many decisions
that parents make affect their own lives as well as those of their
children. Thus, even the relaxed standard for avoiding conflicts of
interest between corporate directors and shareholders would be
costly if applied to parents. It is hard to imagine effective self-
enforcement of a precommitment under which, for example, a par-
ent would be required to ensure that a proposed move across the
country for professional advancement is in the child's interest.
Such a restriction would be unsatisfactory both because of the
demoralization costs that it imposed and because of the fundamen-
tal uncertainty about how and to what extent particular parental
choices affect children's interests. These costs, together with the
pervasive character of the informal norms that reinforce commit-
ments of diligence and loyalty, imply that the parties to an ex ante
bargain would instead contract for a legal presumption of good
faith and reasonable diligence in assessing parental performance,
116 The distinctive character of family relationships suggests a cautionary note, however.
Because of the vulnerable status of children and the emotional quality of public responses
to that vulnerability, the use of moral rhetoric and an exalted standard of fiduciary duty as
a mechanism to reduce conflicts of interest, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text,
may carry an offsetting risk of intrusive and oppressive policies driven by a societal zeal to
protect children.
117 Of course, the extent of the state's interest in promoting procreation depends on a
number of other factors, including rates of population growth and available resources, such
as land. The state has an unambiguous interest in adequate parenting of the children who
are produced.
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analogous to the presumption applied to corporate directors. 118
We call this presumption a "parental judgment rule."
Some parental actions and judgments, however, would not be
protected by a parental judgment rule. As powerful as are extrale-
gal influences on parental behavior, these normative forces, by
themselves, cannot be relied upon to align parents' and children's
interests in all instances. Thus, some specific conflict of interest
-rules would predictably be agreed upon as supplements to a paren-
tal judgment rule. Predicting the precise domain of these rules ex
ante is a problematic exercise. The significant costs entailed in
enforcing legal rules that trump informal norms implies that pre-
emptive conflict of interest rules would be specified only when a
societal consensus about the impact of the regulated conduct on
children dictates a particular choice. These same concerns argue
for retaining parental discretion whenever "reasonable" parents
are likely to differ about what choice promotes the interest of
children.119
By aligning legal rules with prevailing social norms, several of
the potential costs of conflict of interest regulation can be reduced.
First, the saliency of a clear societal consensus significantly reduces
the uncertainties about optimal parental behavior that otherwise
would impose costs on both parents and the state. 20 Preemptive
rules grounded in consensus are clear signals of the limits of
acceptable behavior and are readily enforced by the state. Second,
tracking broadly shared societal norms of parental behavior
enhances the self-enforcing benefits of the legal rules (and concur-
rently reduces demoralization costs).
Optimal parental conflict of interest rules, then, announce a
social consensus that mandates the legislatively designated
approach. Parents who would choose a different course are acting
in a way that conflicts with children's interest. Child labor laws and
11s See supra text accompanying notes 77-79 (summarizing the business judgment rule).
119 For example, it is probable that, a societal consensus supports requiring parents to
assure that their children are educated. In contrast, no consensus supports the
requirement that education need conform to a prescribed curriculum or take place in
public school.
120 In a sense, the existence of a social consensus solves a coordination problem for the
parties by offering a default solution to the bargaining game on some issues. The state's
initial bargaining stance may generally incline toward regulation and the parents' toward
maintaining discretion.
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compulsory school attendance requirements, for example, serve as
legally-supported announcements that children's welfare is fur-
thered by remaining in school until a designated age, and that any
other choice is contrary to their interest.'12 Consensus-driven rules
could also establish minimum age restrictions for drinking, driving
and marriage.
These sorts of legal preemptions are a close analogue to conflict
of interest rules in other fiduciary contexts. In many other settings,
of course, the fiduciary obligation primarily involves financial man-
agement, and thus conflict of interest rules focus on financial deci-
sions.122 Because the scope of parental authority is broader and
includes decisions affecting every aspect of the child's life, legal
rules regulating parents would predictably cover a wider range of
issues, from health to education to discipline. By limiting legally-
imposed restrictions to only those that reflect a normative consen-
sus about the welfare of children, parents are left with broad dis-
cretion to rear their children according to their own values. Thus, a
limited domain for legal regulation promotes the shared objective
of encouraging investment in the parental role. At the same time,
the law reinforces broadly shared social norms in ways that induce
parents to internalize an obligation to attend to their children's
welfare.
c. The Function of Parental Rights
In an ideal regulatory scheme, extralegal and legal norms func-
tion both as complements and substitutes. For example, a parental
judgment rule together with narrowly drawn conflict of interest
rules will specify only the broad parameters for the exercise of
parental discretion. Thus, extralegal norms are a necessary com-
plement to establish the further constraint that discretion does not
imply license to pursue selfish interests. In the same vein, the rela-
121 The prohibition of corporal punishment by parents under Swedish law is another
example. See Greg McIvor, Human Rights: Swedish Parents Demand Right to Smack
Children, Inter Press Service, Feb. 5, 1993, cited in Robert H. Mnookin & D. Kelly
Weisberg, Child, Family & State 333-35 (3d ed. 1995) (describing the policy and suggesting
that consensus supporting it may be in question). That corporal punishment by parents is
not prohibited in this country suggests the lack of a consensus.
122 Some restrictions on guardians deal with other kinds of decisions, because the scope
of guardians' authority encompasses a broader range of decisions.
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tional model predicts that the parties would agree to amplify and
reinforce informal social norms with pervasive and powerful legal
rhetoric of parental fidelity and responsibility.
On first analysis, the conferral of parental rights and the charac-
terization of parents' status in terms of entitlement seems inconsis-
tent with this requirement of complementarity1- 3 Legal attention
to parents' rights appears to weaken informal normative signals
about parental-responsibility and to dilute social sanctions. Thus,
the functioning of extralegal norms that do much of the work to
incline parents toward an attitude of obligation may be under-
mined by a robust concept of parents' rights. Furthermore, a focus
on rights encourages parents to consider their own interests, rather
than their child's, in asserting relationship claims. Through this
lens, the standard assumption that parental rights count against
children's interests makes sense.
Despite its apparently corrosive influence, however, the legal
recognition of parental rights plays a central role in a fiduciary
regime, and its banishment from the family context would entail
substantial costs. The absence of pecuniary compensation to par-
ents for capably performing parental tasks necessarily increases the
value of nonpecuniary substitutes such as reputation and role satis-
faction. 24 On this dimension, parental authority over the relation-
ship with children is offered as the quid pro quo for satisfactory
performance. It is unlikely that, in a hypothetical bargain over the
terms of their performance, parents would agree to undertake the
responsibilities desired by the state without assurance that their
investment would receive legal protection. Recognition of these
parental claims in some form is an important inducement to
encourage investment in children's welfare.
In sum, a regime of parental rights has offsetting effects. To the
extent that rights are closely linked to performance, they serve as
the ex ante compensation for the satisfactory future performance
123 "Rights" of fiduciaries in other contexts are limited to pre-agreed compensation.
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 801 (1983) ("[A]n entrustor
[beneficiary] does not owe the fiduciary anything by virtue of the relation except in
accordance with the agreed-upon terms or legally fixed status duties.").
124 We have noted that even in contexts in which fiduciaries are compensated, non-
pecuniary reputational attributes of the role increase its attractiveness. See supra Part
II.A.3.
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of critically important social functions. But the rhetoric of parental
rights (especially when it is divorced from the quid pro quo of
parental obligation) can also intensify parental inclinations to view
the relationship in terms of self-interest. One method of correcting
for these negative effects is to clarify the link between rights and
responsibilities and to impose substantial sanctions, such as restric-
tion or withdrawal of parental authority, for serious default on
parental obligations.
d. Monitoring Mechanisms
The relational model suggests that, within the intact family,
bonding arrangements will dominate, and that extralegal influences
on parents' behavior will do much of this work. The effectiveness
of these norms reduces the relative benefits of monitoring alterna-
tives. Moreover, direct state monitoring of parental performance
in the intact family is awkward and very costly.'2 5 Monitoring rules
used in other fiduciary contexts, such as judicial supervision of
important decisions and regular reporting requirements, would
impose demoralization and uncertainty costs on parents who are
presumptively the superior caretakers for their children. More-
over, systematic monitoring by governmental agencies represents
an intrusion into family privacy which carries a further relational
cost. These arguments together provide strong support for a
parental judgment rule which establishes a presumption of reason-
able diligence and good faith in the exercise of parental duties.
Nonetheless, some specific devices to detect and discourage defi-
cient parental behavior are cost-justified. For example, mandatory
school physical examinations are a low-cost means of evaluating
children's health and development. Psychological evaluations
would serve a similar function. In addition, teachers, doctors, and
baby-sitters can serve as informal, but effective, monitors. More
125 For this reason among others, systematic state monitoring is simply not cost-effective
in the absence of parental default. The experience with in-home supervision in abuse-
neglect cases supports the proposition that such direct state monitoring is awkward and
inefficient. If a court opts to leave children in their parents' home, it can order the parents
to allow a public health nurse to visit the child, to participate in therapy or alcohol or drug
addiction programs, or to bring the child to public daycare. See Wald, supra note 51, at
630. Making sure parents comply requires constant monitoring by public caseworkers who
are generally overburdened and underfunded. See Garrison, supra note 51, at 432 n.44
(summarizing the caseload burdens on social workers).
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formally, child abuse reporting statutes impose a duty on all profes-
sionals dealing with children-as well as an opportunity for neigh-
bors and acquaintances-to bring seriously deficient parental
conduct to the attention of 'child protective service agencies. 26
Parents who receive public welfare support are subject to an addi-
tional level of monitoring by social service professionals. 2 7
As in any contractual relationship, both parties' interests are
served by stipulating sanctions for breach. In the case of the intact
family, the principal sanction for deficient parental performance is
reduction or withdrawal of parental rights. Upon default by the
parent, the presumption of good faith and due diligence gives way
to more precise monitoring rules that confine parental discretion.
Parents whose children are found to be abused or neglected will be
subject to formal judicial and agency supervision. In this way, par-
ents whose precommitments prove unreliable are more carefully
monitored until the deficient behavior is cured. If the parents'
default is judged to be irremediable, further sanctions can be
imposed, including termination of parental rights (after an appro-
priate judicial proceeding)', followed by placement with substitute
adoptive parents.
In short, as this somewhat stylized description suggests, state
monitoring of parental conduct has limited utility (and higher
costs) in the context of the intact family. However, monitoring
plays an important role in a scheme of sanctions once evidence of
parental deficiencies overcomes the presumption of good faith and
diligence.
3. Reducing Conflicts of Interest in Broken Families
The preceding discussion suggests that there will be some signifi-
cant differences between the optimal means of aligning the inter-
ests of parents and children in intact families and those that are
best for reducing conflicts of interest between children and non-
126 See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 11,166 (West Supp. 1995). This statute requires not only
professiorlals such as doctors or teachers to report abuse, but also film developers who
discover possible sexual abuse of children captured on film.
127 This form of parental monitoring is controversial, of course, because it focuses on
poor families. Some observers believe that the disproportionate number of poor parents
who are the subject of abuse/neglect investigations is attributable to the fact that they are
subject to greater governmental scrutiny. See Wald, supra note 51, at 629 n.21.
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custodial parents. A hypothetical ex ante bargain between non-
custodial parents and the state would most likely rely upon a signif-
icantly different combination of extralegal norms and legal rules,
and of bonding and monitoring arrangements.
Several distinct situations present contexts for regulation of the
relationship of children and non-custodial parents. One category
of cases involves biological parents (usually fathers) who have
never lived in a family unit with the child. In others, the dissolu-
tion of the family unit may result from divorce or separation, or
from state intervention and removal of the child because of inade-
quate parental performance. In some sense, it seems curiou, to
conceive of these parents as fiduciaries, and surely a threshold
question is whether the law should encourage any involvement
with their children. In general, parents not living with their chil-
dren perform a greatly diminished parental role, and those whose
children have been placed in state custody have been specifically
found to be deficient as caretakers. In these contexts, if no parent-
child bond has developed, the benefit to the child of promoting
further parental commitment may be offset by counterbalancing
costs. Nonetheless, so long as the state pursues the objective of
promoting the interests of children, the model of parents as fiducia-
ries applies equally to the relationship between the non-custodial
parent and the child. Differences in the regulatory regime turn in
part on variations in the content of the desired parental perform-
ance and in the anticipated conflicts of interest that occur when the
child and parents no longer form a family unit.
a. The Importance of the Non-Custodial Parent-Child
Relationship
The first question, then, is what are the goals of legal regulation
of non-custodial parents, and what kind of parenting performance
should be encouraged. The relational model dictates different
responses depending on whether or not established family relation-
ships exist.
The case for encouraging involvement by a non-custodial parent
rests first on the non-trivial value attached to biological
parenthood. First, biological parenthood may be an important
influence on behavior. If we accept the lessons of sociobiology,
biology inclines parents to care for and protect their children to a
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greater extent than stepparents or other non-genetically related
substitute parents.128 The genetic link can reinforce and strengthen
the crescive bond that defines the relationship as central to per-
sonal identity.129 Second, the bond to the biological parent has
value to the child. Children find meaning in their genetic ties as a
source of personal identity, a tendency that is evident in the efforts
of adopted children to establish a link to their biological parents.
The response of children whose biological parents have severed
ties reveals the psychological importance to children of this rela-
tionship. 130 Thus, the relational model supports encouraging non-
custodial biological parents to invest in a relationship with their
children absent offsetting costs to relationships with parents filling
more substantial functions.
The importance of the biological link justifies providing the non-
custodial parent with the opportunity to establish a relationship
with his infant child. If a parent fails to act expeditiously, and the
child establishes such bonds with other adults, the risk of offsetting
costs argues against further parental involvement.' 3' The parent
who is dilatory in assuming responsibilities may be supplanted by
another; at this point further involvement is more disruptive than
beneficial.
128 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
129 See White, supra note 107, at 4-5.
130 Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly have found that children visited infrequently by
their fathers suffered severely diminished self-esteem during the first five years after the
separation of their parents. See Wallerstein & Kelly, Parental Divorce: Experiences of the
Child in Later Latency, supra note 4. Robert Hess and Kathleen Camara have found that
children who maintained positive relationships with both parents demonstrated less
aggression and stress and functioned more effectively in work and social relations with
their peers. Robert D. Hess & Kathleen A. Camara, Post-Divorce Family Relationships as
Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, 35 J. Soc. Issues 79, 92-95
(1979). Children who have lost or never had fathers yearn for them and feel disappointed
by their absence. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1765. Studies show that there is an
increase in delinquency and antisocial behavior when the father is absent. This
delinquency is much more pronounced when the father is absent because of separation or
divorce rather than death. See J.W.B. Douglas, J.M. Ross, W.A. Hammond & D.G.
Mulligan, Delinquency and Social Class, 6 Brit. J. Criminology 294, 300 (1966); H.B.
Gibson, Early Delinquency in Relation to Broken Homes, 10 J. Child Psychol. &
Psychiatry 195,203 (1969); Michael Rutter, Parent-Child Separation: Psychological Effects
on the Children, 12 J. Child Psychol. & Psychiatry 233, 241-42 (1971).
131 This point will be developed further in the analysis of the rights of unmarried fathers.
See infra Part III.A.2.
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When the parent and child have an established relationship, usu-
ally built through life together in a family, the situation is quite
different. Except where parental conduct is so harmful that it war-
rants severing the relationship or where the parent has had mini-
mal involvement, the continuing importance of this relationship for
the child persists even when parent and child are no longer part of
a family unit. Parents are not fungible players in their children's
lives, and disruption of the parent-child bond is costly to children's
psychological health. 132 For these reasons, both child-development
experts and policy analysts argue for protecting established parent-
child relationships outside of the intact family. 133 Thus, the basic
132 Most child-development experts emphasize the harm to the child of any disruption of
the parent-child bond. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert J. Solnit, for example,
argue against removal of the child from parental custody except under the most
threatening of circumstances, positing that disruption of the bond is almost always
extremely destructive. See Goldstein et al., supra note 4, at 4-14. Policies of state
intervention and removal are premised on a view that weighs more heavily the harm to
children of inadequate parenting and less heavily the harm of disruption.
Researchers have found that adoption is associated with psychological adjustment
problems. See Garrison, supra note 51, at 470 & n.218 (citing studies finding that adopted
childreh are disproportionately vulnerable to psychological and emotional problems).
Adoptees' emotional problems are generally worse the older they are at adoption. See id.
at 471 & n.223 (citing studies finding that the later the age of adoption, the greater the
frequency and severity of emotional problems).
133 See, e.g., studies cited supra note 132; Andre P. Derdeyn, Andrew R. Rogoff & Scott
W. Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After Long Term
Foster Care, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1165 (1978); Garrison, supra note 51; see also infra note 143
and accompanying text (clarifying that the reform movement that favors shared parenting
after divorce is predicated in part on the importance for the child's welfare of continued
involvement by both parents).
Legal rules governing state intervention in families have been reformulated both to
discourage removal of the child from parental custody, and, if the child is removed, to
encourage remediation of parental deficiencies so that the child can be returned to
parental custody. A primary example of such legislation is the federal Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Act was designed to change the emphasis of child
protection services from centering on foster care to centering on either maintaining the
child in her original family or creating a new family through adoption. Thus, the Act, while
beginning with the presumption that parents are the first best caretakers, does not seek to
maintain the parent-child relationship if parents continue to be deficient. The goal then
becomes to provide the child with a new permanent family through adoption. See supra
note 35 (summarizing the provisions of the Act). The Act has not been very successful at
achieving its goals. For analyses of the success of the Act, see Alice C. Shotton, Making
Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev.
223 (1990); MaryLee Allen, Crafting a Federal Legislative Framework for Child Welfare
Reform, 61 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 610 (1991).
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legal objectives that shape regulation of intact families-encour-
agement of parental responsibility and commitment to the relation-
ship-are unchanged in this context, even though the parental role
is more limited.
b. Replacing Informal Norms with Legal Regulation
Within the intact family, extralegal bonds of biology, affection,
and crescive attachment, together with internalized informal norms
about parenting, are assumed to function effectively, mitigating
potential conflicts of interest without extensive legal regulation.
When the family is fractured,^ however, either voluntarily 34 or
because the parents' performance has been found to be inade-
quate, there is greater reason to question the power of extralegal
constraints on parents' inclination to act selfishly. A presumption
of good faith and reasonable diligence, as reflected in a parental
judgment rule, is not warranted. This necessarily increases the
demand for more elaborate legal rules to ameliorate potential
conflicts.
Parents who lack custody of their children because of divorce or
dissolution and those whose children are in state custody are more
likely than parents in intact families to choose self-interest over
parental responsibility. Selfish behavior by non-custodial parents
is more prevalent, even when those parents were unselfish custodi-
ans when the family was intact. In a typical example, the divorced
father who previously seemed to care about his children's educa-
tion refuses to contribute to college expenses. Divorced parents
defect on obligations that they would have fulfilled before divorce
in part because the postulated identity of interests between parent
and child erodes over time. For some non-custodial parents, the
crescive bond of parenthood grows more attenuated, such that
being the child's parent becomes less central to personal identity. 35
134 Voluntary dissolution occurs most commonly when the parents divorce. Of course,
the issues created by divorce would arise whenever the child's parents dissolved their
relationship, whether or not they are married.
135 Several researchers have found that many fathers withdraw from the relationship
with their children after divorce. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery, E. Mavis Hetherington &
Lisabeth F. Dilalla, Divorce, Children, and Social Policy, in 1 Child Development Research
and Social Policy 189, 213 (Harold W. Stevenson & Alberta E. Siegel eds., 1984) (citing
FurstenburgSpanier & Rothchild, Patterns of Parenting in the Transition from Divorce to
Remarriage in Women: A Developmental Perspective 325 (Phyllis W. Berman & Estelle
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As the unity of parents' and children's interests dissolves, the risk
of conflicts intensifies. Moreover, for many non-custodial parents,
the rewards of parenthood diminish after divorce,'136 reducing fur-
ther the incentive to invest in the relationship with their children.
Parent-child interaction is less frequent and is often accompanied
by conflicts with the former spouse. Other attachments, perhaps to
a new family and different children, substitute for those in the dis-
solved family, and the fulfillment of previously established parental
responsibilities becomes more burdensome.
Parents whose children have been placed in state custody pres-
ent a somewhat different case for more pervasive legal oversight.
Assuming that the state has correctly judged their parenting to be
deficient,'137 these parents have revealed themselves to be insuffi-
ciently influenced by the informal norms that shape parental
behavior. Since informal mechanisms have failed, more formal
legal constraints and sanctions are required to reduce the risk of
misbehavior.
Encouraging non-custodial parents to act in their children's
interest requires translating informal norms into more explicit legal
directives. Two examples under current law make the point. Par-
ents whose children have been removed by the state and placed in
foster care are subject to explicit directives (usually in a foster care
R. Ramey eds., 1982)). See also Hetherington et al., Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 4,
at 93; Wallerstein & Kelly, Visiting Father-Child Relationship, supra note 4, at 1534.
136 Many fathers tend to find this non-custodial relationship artificial and unsatisfactory.
See Furstenburg et al., supra note 135, at 331; Mel Roman & William Haddad, The
Disposable Parent: The Case for Joint Custody (1978); Judith B. Greif, Fathers, Children,
and Joint Custody, 49 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 311 (1979). Hetherington, Cox & Cox found
that some fathers reported that they could not tolerate the artificial relationship permitted
by visitation. See Hetherington et al., Divorced Fathers, supra note 4, at 427. See also C.
William Briscoe & James B. Smith, Depression in Bereavement and Divorce, 32 Archives
Gen. Psychiatry 439 (1975); Briscoe & Smith, Depression and Marital Turmoil, 29 Arch.
Gen. Psych. 811 (1973). Hetherington, Cox & Cox describe the stereotypical "Disneyland
Daddy" relationships in which fathers see their children occasionally and shower them with
gifts but do not develop real relationships. See Hetherington et al., Divorced Fathers,
supra note 4, at 425-26; see also Grief, supra, at 315 ("Fathers experiencing greater child
absence are more prone ... to entertain their children with constant activity, despite a
repeated disdain for being seen as a 'Sugar Daddy.' ").
137 We acknowledge that state intervention in families may sometimes be driven by class
biases that affect social workers' assessment of adequate parenting, rather than parents'
conduct that actually conflicts with the child's interest. For the purpose of this analysis, we
set this issue aside.
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plan) that define their obligation to their children. Parents may be
required to abstain from drinking alcohol, to clean up the house, to
participate in therapy, or to terminate a relationship with another
adult who abuses the child.138 In the divorce context, non-custodial
parents are subject to court orders directing them to provide finan-
cial support to their children, while custodial parents and parents in
intact families are not. Parents in family units. share their chil-
dren's standard of living and, through informal influences, can usu-
ally be trusted collectively to take their children's needs into
account in allocating family resources. Moreover, for reasons dis-
cussed earlier, oversight of parents' financial decisions in intact
families imposes demoralization costs, and is unlikely to yield sig-
nificant net benefits for the child. Parents not living with their chil-
dren, on the other hand, are less likely to give priority to their
child's financial needs and may require a formal legal incentive in
the form of a child support order.
The status of parents as "joint fiduciaries" further complicates
the process of designing optimal rules for non-custodial divorced
parents. In the intact family, the issue of disagreement between
parents over appropriate caretaking actions is resolved by a pre-
138 The Virginia Code, for example, states that a "foster care plan shall describe... the
participation and conduct which will be sought from the child's parents and other prior
custodians . . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-281(B)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1995). At periodic
reviews, a petition must be filed for each child that "set[s] forth in detail the manner in
which the foster care plan previously filed with the court was or was not complied with and
the extent to which the goals thereof have been met." Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-282(B)(6)
(Michie Supp. 1995). The court may terminate parental rights if parents fail to remedy the
conditions which led to foster care placement in the first place. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
283(C)(2) (Michie 1988). Foster care plans can include a variety of conditions on parents,
depending on the conditions which led to foster care placement. See, e.g., Comer v.
Virginia Beach Dep't of Social Servs., No. 2103-94-1, 1995 WL 91399 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
(requiring mother to complete an alcohol abuse treatment program, attend weekly
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and avoid voluntary contact with her abusive husband);
Durham v. Alexandria Dep't of Social Servs., No. 2176-93-4, 1994 WL 242442 (Va. Ct.
App. 1994) (requiring "home based services" and mental health counseling); Hileman v.
Winchester Dep't of Social Servs., No. 0320-93-4, 1994 WL 161390 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)
(requiring counseling sessions for paranoid schizophrenic); Hunter v. Commonwealth, No.
2592-92-3, 1993 WL 364736 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring substance abuse therapy and
psychological testing); Edwards v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., No. 2607-92-4,
1993 WL 302380 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring mother to receive substance abuse
treatment and mental health counseling, stop associating with drug dealers and users, find
stable and appropriate housing, obtain employment, maintain weekly visitation with her
daughters, and acknowledge the abuse and neglect suffered by them).
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sumption that the family unit will generate consensus on the best
course of action. But in the case of divorce or dissolution, there is
a significant risk of conflict between parents over how best to pro-
mote children's interests. This requires more elaborate and formal
rules to resolve potential disputes between the fiduciaries. Thus,
explicit directives may be required to signal which parent has
authority to make particular decisions (such as those regarding reli-
gious practice or education) and how the child's time is to be allo-
cated between the parents.139  Arrangements that would be
reached informally and by consensus in the intact family may be
prescribed by court order,140 and in cases of irreconcilable conflict,
legal rules must determine which parent is to exercise sole author-
ity as decisionmaker. 14 1 Predictably, under a relational model, the
parent with primary responsibility (physical custody) retains
greater decisionmaking authority (legal custody) when parents can-
not cooperate. This authority serves as ex ante compensation for
the fulfillment of more expansive parental obligations.
In sum, in both the divorce and abuse/neglect contexts, legal
rules articilate and reinforce informal social norms regarding
parental responsibility, norms which in intact families are pre-
sumed adequate by themselves to constrain behavior. The state
substitutes formal, legal rules for the informal arrangements that
govern the intact family because in this context the informal mech-
anisms are inadequate. Moreover, re-articulating informal norms
139 Separation agreements and court orders often incorporate a schedule describing
when the child will be with each parent, including a schedule for holidays, vacations and
birthdays. Experts suggest that the more arrangements for the child can be reduced to
precise written terms, the less the potential for future conflict. See Robert Emery,
Renegotiating Family Relationships: Divorce, Child Custody, and Mediation 162-67
(1994).
140 Courts have authority to order parents to cooperate with each other and prohibit
each from undermining the child's relationship with the other parent. See Va. Code Ann.
§§ 20-124.2,20-124.3 (Michie Supp. 1995). Courts may threaten withdrawal of custody if a
parent fails to cooperate. See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 72 (N.J. 1981).
141 When parents have joint legal custody, they share legal authority to make decisions
regarding education, religious practice, etc. Courts sometimes set aside joint custody
orders and give one parent sole legal custody when parents are not able to cooperate about
these issues. See, e.g., Schultz v. Elremmash, 615 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (awarding
sole custody to mother after joint custody arrangement broke down over father's desire to
take child for visits to Libya and his desire that daughter be isolated from Catholicism and
American political culture).
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in legal prescriptions serves to reinforce the independent weight of
the informal precommitments. 142
c. Rewards of the Parental Role
If maintaining a relationship with the non-custodial parent is
important to the child's welfare, then the ex ante bargain must pro-
vide for enhanced role and relationship rewards for the parent as
well as encourage responsible conduct. Moreover, enforcement
costs will be reduced if parents are inclined voluntarily to meet
their parental obligations, and voluntary compliance will increase
with greater role satisfaction and relationship rewards. Fiduciaries
in other contexts (including custodial parents) are motivated in
part by reputational and other nonpecuniary rewards. Non-custo-
dial parents similarly will respond to recognition that they have an
important parental role.
From this perspective, joint legal custody after divorce consti-
tutes a symbolic acknowledgment of parental status and authority;
it promotes fatherly involvement that may translate into more
faithful fulfillment of financial responsibility. 43 Common sense
142 Thus, legal regulation requiring noncustodial parents to provide financial support to
their children signals the law's endorsement of one form of parental obligation. Moreover,
the extent to which enforcement of this duty is lax or rigorous indicates whether or not this
responsibility is an important societal value.
143 Proponents of joint custody argue that it will promote sharing of parental
responsibility and will reduce the tendency of fathers to withdraw from their relationship
with their children after divorce. This issue is discussed in Elizabeth Scott & Andre
Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455, 458-62 (1984). Some state codes
state this objective explicitly as a legislative purpose. The California Code, for example,
was amended in 1979 to facilitate joint custody. It states:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure
minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage parents to
share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy,
except where the contact would not be in the best interest of the child ....
Cal. Fam. Code § 3020 (West 1994).
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin have found that fathers who see their
children regularly after divorce are more compliant in paying child support, although they
found no correlation between joint custody arrangements per se (as opposed to sole cus-
tbdy with visitation rights) and child support compliance. See Eleanor E. Maccoby &
Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody 250-57
(1992).
The premise that it is important to recognize the status of non-custodial parents can also
be seen in reform measures that affect non-custodial parents in sole custody arrangements.
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supports the notion that non-custodial parents are more likely to
embrace their responsibilities if the relationship continues to offer
emotional rewards. Thus, an optimal regulatory scheme will
encourage frequent contact between the non-custodial parent and
child after divorce, whatever the formal custody arrangement,
unless this contact generates offsetting costs to the child.144 More-
over, custodial parents are properly encouraged to promote the
child's relationship with the other parent. 45 The same point holds
for parents whose children are removed by the state. Encouraging
meaningful contact between parent and child during the period of
state custody and seeking to reestablish the family within a reason-
able time serves to increase parental efforts and commitment.
Imagining an ex ante bargain between non-custodial parents and
the state focuses attention finally on legal termination of the par-
ent-child relationship. Here, distinguishing features of the parent-
child bond complicate the issue. In other settings, beneficiaries
and other agents are presumed to be as well served by one fiduci-
ary as another, and fiduciaries who perform poorly are replaced.
In contrast, once the parent-child relationship is established, even
suboptimal parents have idiosyncratic value to their child. The
relational model thus argues against severing this relationship
unless it results in greater harm than benefit to the child.146 This is
true even when many of the tasks of parenthood have been
assumed by others.
For example, modem law gives non-custodial parents access to their children's school and
medical records, a recognition of their parental status. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-
123.5(7) (1987); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(b)(3) (West Supp. 1995); Idaho Code § 32-717A
(1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-225 (1993). Under traditional law, no such right of access
was available, a small but perhaps particularly grating signal that these parents held a
diminished legal status as parents.
144 For example, if the parents have a very conflictual relationship, the costs to the child
of being subject to the conflict may offset the benefit of continued contact with both
parents. See Robert E. Emery, Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and
Divorce, 92 Psych. Bull. 310, 313 (1982); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 143, at 490-92.
145 See supra note 140. Custody statutes also make the inclination of each parent to
support the child's relationship with the other parent a factor in deciding custody.
146 See Goldstein et al., supra note 4, at 4-14 (advocating a policy of "minimum state
intervention" in the family). When the state intervenes in the family to promote the
welfare of children, the minimum that can be asked is that it not do more harm than good.
See Franklin E. Zimring, The Changing Legal World of Adolescence 62 (1982).
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4. Summary
The relational model of parents as fiduciaries suggests the con-
tours of an optimal regime for regulating the parent-child relation-
ship. Informational and control asymmetries generate a significant
risk of conflicts of interest in parent-child relationships. The costs
of these deviations from the norm of parental responsibility toward
children can be efficiently reduced by a legal regime that is con-
structed around a pre-existing network of informal social norms.
By selecting the appropriate mix of extralegal and legal norms and
of bonding and monitoring arrangements, a fully integrated regula-
tory regime can function harmoniously both to encourage parents
to approach the tasks of child-rearing with an elevated sense of
duty and to detect when parents fail to perform those tasks
adequately. 'I
The character of legal regulation will differ depending on
whether or not the family is intact. In the intact family, extralegal
norms do much of the work to promote desired parental behavior.
This is a function of the relatively high cost of monitoring and the
correspondingly lower costs of effective bonding alternatives. In
this setting, bonding through psychological attachment and infor-
mal social norms is an efficient substitute for invasive restraints on
discretion and family privacy. Legal directives that function as sup-
plemental precommitments are appropriately limited to issues
where a strong societal consensus dictates mandatory behavior.
Viewed only from the perspective of legal regulation, such a regime
may seem imbalanced: a broad recognition of parental rights and
authority, together with a narrowly drawn set of legal responsibili-
ties. This apparent inequality dissipates, however, once the power-
ful effects of extralegal norms are recognized.
The optimal regulatory patterns change when the subject of legal
regulation is the non-custodial parent. Here, legal regulatory pre-
scriptions are necessary substitutes for the informal norms that are
relied upon in the intact family. The substitution of more exacting
legal standards is justified by the weakening of informal norms, the
breach of the obligation to provide satisfactory care, and by the
potential for conflict between parents as joint fiduciaries.
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III. THE RELATIONAL MODEL AND MODERN FAMILY LAW
In this Part, we apply the relational model of parents as fiducia-
ries to contemporary family law. We will argue that, to a consider-
able extent, the model explains the deep structure of the legal
regulation of the parent-child relationship. Although generally not
described in these terms, the parent-child relationship is regulated
by a variety of interactive mechanisms that function to encourage
parents to serve their children's interests better. Analyzing family
law from a fiduciary perspective also reveals particular areas in
which legal norms depart from these principles. Certain aspects of
contemporary law regulating divorce and termination of parental
rights, for example, appear to exacerbate conflicts of interest
between parent and child. More generally, the rhetoric of parental
rights, unconstrained by any explicit conceptual framework, may
undermine informal norms and distort the feedback function of
rights in a fiduciary scheme.
A. Contemporary Family Law as a Fiduciary Regime
1. Some General Similarities
The peculiar shape and character of contemporary family law
conforms, in large measure, to the predictions of the relational
model of parents as fiduciaries. Parental performance in the intact
family is shaped largely by extensive extralegal norms and by a cor-
relative presumption of parental authority and discretion. Explicit
legal commands are limited largely to a series of preemptive rules
that define the boundaries of parental discretion. The array of pre-
emptive rules, including compulsory school attendance require-
ments, child labor restrictions, curfew laws and vaccination
requirements, appears to function principally as a means of rein-
forcing powerful extralegal influences.
As the model predicts, the set of regulatory mechanisms changes
when the family dissolves; informal social norms are replaced by
formal prescriptive rules. For example, parents whose children are
in foster care are subject to state agency directives regarding their
obligations under foster care plans.147 These parents, having devi-
147 As discussed previously, court orders sometimes direct one parent not to undermine
the child's relationship with the other parent, not to involve the child in a particular
religious practice, etc. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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ated from informal normative standards, are provided with explicit
performance objectives (at least in theory14 8) that must be met
before they can resume custody. The foster care plan functions as
a more formal bonding arrangement, creating incentives for par-
ents to avoid parenting practices that conflict with their child's wel-
fare and clarifying the sanctions for breach of the commitment.
The recent trend promoting shared parenting after divorce,
either through joint custody or through sanctions against uncoop-
erative parents,'149 is further evidence of the descriptive power of
the relational model. 50 As with foster care plans, these require-
148 See Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Children in
Foster Care, in Foster Children in the Courts 128 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983). Hardin cites
the Colorado statute defining "residual parental rights and responsibilities" as:
those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent ... including, but not
necessarily limited to, the responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption,
the right to reasonable visitation unless restricted by the court, and the right to
determine the child's religious affiliation.
Id. at 181 n.49 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103(24) (1978)). Hardin also cites: Idaho
Code § 16-1602(p) (1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119 § 26 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-49 (1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33 § 632(a)(16) (1981); Va. Code
Ann. § 16.1-228(S) (Michie 1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.34.160 (Supp. 1981). Id. at
181 nn. 49, 52.
149 There has been much criticism of the implementation of foster care plans by social
service agencies. The criticisms are either that state agencies are dilatory or unclear in
setting objectives, or that they don't provide services necessary for parents to comply with
requirements-
150 For a discussion of joint custody, see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
Under what have been described as "friendly parent" provisions, judges are encouraged in
custody hearings to consider which parent is more likely to support the other parent's
relationship with the child. The goal is to foster the relationships of both parents with the
child. For examples of friendly parent provisions, see Alaska Stat. §§ 25.20.060,
25.24.150(c)(6) (1991); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-332(A)(6) (Supp. 1994); Cal. Fam. Code
Ann. § 3040(a)(1) (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-124(1.5)(f) (1987); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 61.13(3)(a) (West Supp. 1995); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 134(10) (West Supp. 1995); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3)(j) (West Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.17(13) (West
Supp. 1995); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-223 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125.480(3)(a)
(Michie 1993); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5303(a) (1991). Such provisions discourage
parents from presenting evidence that joint custody would be against the best interest of
the child, because presenting such evidence can make a judge feel that the adversarial
parent is unlikely to foster the child's relationship with the other parent. See Scott &
Derdeyn, supra note 143, at 476 nn.101-02 (1984) (summarizing the policy imperatives
underlying friendly parent provisions); see also Joanne Schulman.& Valerie Pitt, Second
Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women
and Children, 12 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 539, 554-56 (1982) (noting that friendly parent
provisions promote the use of custody as a bargaining chip by parents seeking to minimize
child support obligations or to maintain access to a victim of abuse).
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ments function to formalize norms of parental cooperation that are
implicitly presumed when parents live together. Upon divorce,
conflict between the parents may undermine the cooperative norm
and promote conduct that conflicts with the child's interest.
Viewed in this way, the controversy surrounding joint custody may
reflect a dispute about whether the formal requirement of post-
divorce cooperation distorts pre-divorce norms and conduct, and
whether the law is realistic in assuming that divorced parents can
cooperate as joint fiduciaries to the extent that joint custody
requires.'5
As the model predicts, monitoring arrangements are used far
more extensively upon family breakdown. In general, parents who
are divorced, and to a far greater extent, those whose children are
in state custody, are subject to a degree of judicial and state agency
supervision that would be deemed violative of family privacy if
applied to intact families. Increasingly tough child support
enforcement procedures assure that non-custodial parents fulfill
their financial duty.'Y2 Courts may authorize formal agency super-
vision of abusive or neglectful parents. 5 3 Moreover, regular judi-
cial supervision is used to determine whether these parents are
progressing in remediating performance deficiencies. 154
Divorce lawyers utilize evidence of what has been designated "parental alienation
syndrome" to establish the claim that the opponent has sought to turn the child against the
other parent. See Richard A. Gardener, The Parental Alienation Syndrome (1992). For a
critical analysis, see Cheri L. Wood, Note & Comment, The Parental Alienation Syndrome:
A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1367 (1994).
151 For example, a joint custody order can coerce cooperation between a primary
caretaker and a formerly uninvolved parent.
152 See supra notes 113-14.
153 Such supervision involves mandatory family cooperation with the agency's treatment
plan and regular agency monitoring of the family. See supra note 125; see also Bonnie
Kamen & Betty Gewirtz, Child Maltreatment and the Court, in Clinical Social Work with
Maltreated Children and their Families: An Introduction to Practice 178, 183-84 (Shirley
M. Ehrenkranz et al. eds., 1989).
154 The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), requires the development of a case plan
for every child in foster care, a review of the plan every six months, and a "dispositional
hearing" no later than eighteen months after a child enters foster care. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 627(a)(2)(B), 671(a)(16), 675(1), 675(5) (1988). For a discussion of these provisions, see
MaryLee Allen, Carol Golubock & Lynn Olson, A Guide to the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, in Foster Children in the Courts 575, 582-84 (Mark Hardin ed.,
1983). Periodic review has been established in a majority of states. For examples of
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Even features of contemporary family law that are convention-
ally understood as serving the interests of parents can better be
understood and rationalized as promoting the goal of optimizing
the parent-child relationship. Thus, for example, legal restrictions
on state supervision of families are commonly thought to reflect
deference toward parental authority, and are justified in the rheto-
ric of parental rights. 155 Some critics assume that this deference to
parental authority would be greatly diminished were the law to
focus instead on children's welfare.156 To the contrary, however,
our analysis indicates that a fiduciary regime will rely substantially
on informal norms to shape responsible parental behavior and that
explicit legal directives will not serve the desired ends of enhancing
parental performance. 57 Moreover, the relational model suggests
that parental authority and discretion are the necessary quid pro
quos for parents undertaking the responsibilities of parenthood.
Thus, setting aside the rhetoric of parental rights, deference to fam-
ily privacy fits comfortably into a fiduciary framework.
2. Relationship Claims of Unmarried Fathers
a. Parents' Rights in the Supreme Court
In a series of opinions dealing with the claims of unmarried bio-
logical fathers, the Supreme Court has struggled to define the
current laws, see Cal. Weif. & Inst. Code § 366,366.22 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. Soc. Servs.
Law Ann. § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
155 See Dwyer, supra note 9; Schneider, supra note 30, at 1835-42; Fitzgerald, supra note
8, at 37-45; Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1112-22; see also Bartlett, supra note 7, at 297-98
(characterizing the rhetoric of parental rights as intrinsic to the modem liberal state);
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1811 (arguing that the "possessive individualism" underlying
parental rights objectifies children).
156 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7; Dwyer, supra note 9; Fitzgerald, supra note 8;
Woodhouse, supra note 1. Some experts have proposed policies of extensive state
oversight to protect children. In the 1970s, Henry Kempe proposed a Home Visitor
Program to undertake health monitoring of all infants at home. See Richard J. Light,
Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alternative Policies, 43 Harv. Ed.
Rev. 556, 567-71 (1973).
157 Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert J. Solnit emphasize the importance for the
child's welfare of an undisturbed parent-child bond. See Goldstein et al., supra note 4, at
4-14. Zealous efforts to protect children's welfare in the intact family also run the risk of
inefficient use and exhaustion of scarce resources, which are dissipated and not targeted
toward situations in which intervention is needed. For a discussion of the difficulties in
actually measuring levels of child abuse, see Light, supra note 156, at 560-67; R. Gellas,
Demythologizing Child Abuse, Family Coordinator, Apr. 1976, at 135-38.
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rights of unmarried fathers, a group of parents who historically
were presumed to lack any legally protected interest in their rela-
tionship with their children. 58 Under current constitutional doc-
trine, biology is an important but not sufficient condition for
establishing a cognizable parental claim.'5 9 Under the Court's
analysis, legal protection of the biological father's parental rela-
tionship is strongly correlated to his investment in and fulfillment
of his parental role. Thus, the constitutional analysis conforms to
the predictions of the relational model, although it has not been
couched in these terms.
In Stanley v. Illinois, ° the Supreme Court extended parental
rights to an unmarried biological father who had lived with his chil-
dren and their mother until her death.' 6' Stanley invalidated an
Illinois statute that established a presumption of unfitness for
unmarried fathers and automatically transferred custody to the
state upon the death of the mother.162 The Court recognized Stan-
ley's legitimate interest in a continuing relationship with his chil-
dren and held that the state could not terminate that interest
without giving him an opportunity to demonstrate his fitness as a
parent. 63
Stanley can be understood on one level as simply announcing
that formal marriage is not a predicate for legal protection of a
father's relationship with his child. The case was described by the
Court as presenting an unremarkable father-child relationship in
an intact family, except that Stanley and the mother of the children
were unmarried. 64 In extending parental rights to Stanley, the
Court implicitly recognized that the parent-child relationship is the
core value that underlies the legal recognition of parental rights.
158 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
159 As the Supreme Court stated in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983), "the
biological connection . . . offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."
160 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
161 The majority assumed that Stanley performed his parental role adequately. The
dissent, and some critics of the opinion, were not so charitable, suggesting that Stanley
played an episodic role in his children's lives and was far from the exemplary parent. See
id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
162 See id. at 646-49.
163 Id. at 649, 658. At the same time, the Court found the state's interest in separating
children from fit parents to be de minimis. Id. at 657-58.
164 See id. at 651-52.
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Since Stanley, the Court has considered the claims of several
unmarried fathers, each seeking to block adoption of their child by
a stepparent. The articulated basis for separating successful and
unsuccessful parental rights claims in these cases has been evidence
that the father established a relationship with his child and filled a
parental role. 65 The Court has endorsed protection of the rela-
165 Fathers who do not live with their children are more likely to have their relationship
claims recognized if they were once part of a family unit with their children. This factor
distinguishes the fathers in two Supreme Court opinions after Stanley: Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Both Quilloin and
C'aban sought to block the adoption of their children by the husbands of the children's
mothers, under similar Georgia and New York statutes which allowed adoption over the
objection of the biological father. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 74-203, 74-403(3) (1975)
(Quilloin); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 (McKinney 1977) (Caban). Caban had lived with
the children from their birth until the couple's separation, when the oldest child was four
years old, while Quilloin had never shared a home with his son. The Supreme Court
rejected Quilloin's due process claim, but upheld Caban's equal protection claim.
Janet Dolgin argues that recognition of fathers' claims under Supreme Court doctrine
depends on whether the parent-child relationship was grounded in a shared life with the
child's mother in an acceptable family unit. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial
Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 649-50 (1993). We think that this
is important mostly because it serves as a handy proxy for the kind of involvement that is
relevant to the judicial determination of parental rights.
The family unit will often be the context in which the kind of bond that receives
protection is formed. This factor is not sufficieuit in itself, however, as evidenced by
statutes permitting adoption by stepparents after a period of default by non-custodial
parents, regardless of whether the father once lived with the child. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 25.23.050 (1991); Cal. Fam. Code § 8604(b) (West 1994); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111(1)(d)
(McKinney 1988).
Moreover, nothing in parental rights doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court, or in
the legal treatment of this matter under state law, supports the claim that the father who
fulfills his parental obligations but never lives with the child and her mother will find that
this parent-child relationship is unprotected when a stepfather seeks adoption. The
biological father who develops a parent-child relationship in which he fulfills the
responsibilities of his role by spending time with the child and by providing financial
support on an ongoing basis has parental rights that are unlikely to be set aside.
Some courts have recognized the claims of fathers to rights vis-a-vis children with whom
they have not lived. Usually there is some, uncertainty in these cases as to whether the
father sought a relationship with the child but was prevented by the mother from
establishihg such a relationship. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460
(Ct. App. 1992) (awarding to biological father of child conceived out of wedlock, prior to
mother's marriage to another man, the right to establish paternity of his child); Sider v.
Sider, 639 A.2d 1076 (Md. 1994) (holding that biological father originally unaware of his
paternity was entitled to establish paternity and join mother in seeking transfer of custody
to mother from mother's husband in pending divorce dispute).
The Supreme Court has yet to deal with the case of a father who has a parent-child
relationship and fulfills his fatherly responsibilities by providing financial support to the
child, but who has never lived with the child's mother and the child in a family unit.
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tionship between the child and the father who "demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] for-
ward to participate in the rearing of his child.' "166 In Caban v.
Mohammed, 67 for example, the father had not only lived with his
children, but had provided financial support and had spent time
with the children after his relationship with their mother had
ended. 68 In contrast, the father's efforts in Quilloin v. Walcott169
were sporadic, 170 and in Lehr v. Robertson' 7 ' no parent-child rela-
tionship was ever established. 7 2 In rejecting Lehr's claim that his
unsuccessful efforts should be recognized, the Court emphasized
that only an actual relationship of parental responsibility is entitled
to legal protection. 73 This relationship is important to the parties
and to society because of" 'the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in
'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children.' "'7
166 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
167 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
168 Id. at 382.
169 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
170 Quilloin saw his son now and then and gave occasional gifts and financial support.
Moreover, he only came forward to legitimate his son when the child was eleven years old
and the stepfather had petitioned for adoption. See id. at 247-51.
171 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
172 Id. at 262.
173 Id. Lehr, however, remains something of a puzzle under this analysis. Why was
Lehr, frustrated in his efforts to establish a relationship with his daughter by her mother's
resistance, not rewarded for his efforts (albeit unsuccessful), when finally after more than
two years he asserted his legal claim? The temporal element may be the key to the puzzle.
Genetic fatherhood creates the opportunity, as the Court said, to assert parental rights.
The claim, however, must be made in a timely manner, or the right atrophies. Id. at 262.
Despite the dissent's account, see id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting), Lehr seems at a
minimum to have been inept and dilatory in seeking to establish a legal relationship with
his daughter. He failed to come forward to establish his claim until very late in the game.
See id. at 250-53. (In this regard, he was unlike Daniel Schmidt, who challenged the
DeBoers' adoption petition shortly after the birth of Baby Jessica. See supra note 8.) The
metaphor of the father's rights as a seed seems particularly apt. If tended, the rights grow
into a substantial claim based on a flourishing relationship. If not, they wither away and
eventually die.
In Lehr, the child was well-situated in a family unit with her mother and stepfather, and
with only a hypothetical interest in her relationship with her biological father. The costs of
developing the bonds that would generate a legally protected parental relationship might
well have disserved the child's interests.
174 Id. at 261 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972))).
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The Supreme Court's treatment of biological fathers fits com-
fortably into a fiduciary framework. Fathers like Caban who have
invested in the relationship with their child are granted legal pro-
tection for the relationship. The child benefits when her non-custo-
dial parent works to maintain a relationship previously established
within the family unit. In contrast, no protection is extended to
fathers such as Quilloin who are sporadic in their attention and
who announce a serious commitment only after an established sub-
stitute father threatens their paternal status. This dilatory behavior
conflicts with the child's interest. Even the outcome in Lehr is con-
sistent with the relational model. The failure to initiate a relation-
ship until after a stepfather functionally becomes father to the child
justifies treating the biological father's relationship claim as for-
feited. Tolerating the father's ineffectual efforts to establish a rela-
tionship would encourage strategic behavior and undermine
informal incentives to assume the role of parent. In essence, the
Court has recognized paternal rights of fathers who act like fiducia-
ries. Establishing the desired patterns of behavior reduces the risk
of conflicts of interest between the father and child and justifies
"compensation" in the form of recognized parental rights.
b. Unmarried Fathers Under State Law.
The constitutional framework developed by the Supreme Court
to define the rights of unmarried fathers has influenced state regu-
lation, which conforms as well to the relational model of parents as
fiduciaries. Statutes provide the unmarried father with the oppor-
tunity, when his child is born, to acknowledge paternity and accept
parental responsibility.175 Fathers who are ready to assume full
175 In California, for example, an unmarried man is presumed to be a child's father if he
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child. See
Cal. Fam. Code § 7611(d) (West Supp. 1995). He can also claim paternity by voluntary
declaration at the time of the child's birth, Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7571, 7574 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1995), or by suit, Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7630-7631 (West 1994). A putative father who is
not the presumed father must come forward within 30 days of the birth of the child or
within 30 days of receiving notification that he might be the child's father if the mother is
seeking to put the child up for adoption. See Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7631, 7664, 7666 (West
1994).
In New York, under the statute upheld in Lehr, a father may voluntarily establish
paternity at birth by filling out a notarized acknowledgement of paternity form. N.Y. Pub.
Health Law § 4135-b(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995). He may also bring suit to establish
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parental responsibility can acquire custody of the child, blocking
adoption by third parties even when the mother consents to the
adoption. The law assumes that the biological parent who steps
forward to act as parent will fill this role better than other candi-
dates. On the other hand, biological fatherhood alone is not suffi-
cient to establish a substantial parental claim. Adoption placement
in most jurisdictions will not be defeated by the father who is dila-
tory in assuming responsibilities or who is not ready to accept full
responsibility as a custodial parent.'76
State law responses to the efforts of stepparents to adopt and to
sever paternal rights is similarly explained by a model that links
parental rights with responsibility. The father who fails to maintain
contact with his child or who is seriously delinquent in providing
financial support may lose his parental status when a stepfather
seeks to adopt the child.177 Statutes of limitation in some states
paternity anytime before the child reaches age 21. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 517 (McKinney
Supp. 1995).
176 See, e.g., Adoption of Christopher S., 242 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870 (Ct. App. 1987)
(denying biological father the right to veto adoption because he had not supported
children while he was in prison and prior to imprisonment); In re Raquel Marie X., 559
N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y.) (observing that "the biological father not only must assert his
interest promptly.., but also must manifest his ability and willingness to assume custody
of the child") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990); In re Stephen C., 566
N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that readiness to assume full custody is
threshold criterion for right to veto adoption and thus denying father's attempt to block
adoption because he wanted child's mother or paternal. grandmother to care for child
rather than himself); In re Adoption of Kyle, 592 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560-61 (Surrog. Ct. 1992),
aff'd 601 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that father who had acknowledged
paternity and provided financial support in past could not veto adoption because of
present, lengthy incarceration).
177 In California, the consent of a presumed father is required for adoption unless he has
failed to communicate with and pay support for his child for one year. Cal. Fam. Code
§ 8604 (West 1994). If the child has no presumed father, only the consent of the mother is
required. Cal. Fam. Code § 8605 (West 1994).
In New York, a father of a child over six months old must maintain "substantial and
continuous or repeated contact" with his child, by paying support and either visiting the
child at least monthly or communicating with the child regularly, in order to veto
adoptions. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111(1)(d) (McKinney 1988). The father loses his rights
if he fails to communicate with the child for six months. Id. § 111(2)(a). See also In re
J.JJ., 718 P.2d 948, 954 (Alaska 1986) (holding that biological father who failed to provide
support for at least 12-month period could not block stepfather adoption); Adoption of
Christopher S., 242 Cal. Rptr. at 870; Hergenreder v. Madden, 899 P.2d 1155, 1160-61
(Okla. 1995) (upholding Oklahoma statute allowing adoption without consent of father
who fails to pay court-ordered child support for one year).
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specify forfeiture of parental rights following extended parental
absence and default.178 On the other hand, the stepfather's efforts
to adopt will be unsuccessful if the father has maintained a rela-
tionship based on sustained commitment, contact, and financial
support. By promising legal protection of the relationship, the law
encourages unmarried non-custodial fathers to undertake a lim-
ited, but nonetheless important, parental role.179
3. Explaining the Contours of Legal Regulation
Existing legal regulation of the parent-child relationship is
broadly consistent with the model of parents as fiduciaries. This is
not surprising, despite critics' claim of excessive deference to par-
ents' rights because promoting the welfare of children is an explicit
goal of modem family law. Indeed, legal regulation of the parent-
child relationship is the one area of contemporary family law
where the modem trend toward pursuit of self-interest is categori-
cally modified. 180 Principles of parental obligation increasingly
shape regulation and constitute strong themes in political and
scholarly commentary.' 8' It follows that the law would discourage
178 See supra note 177 (discussing the California and New York statutes); see also
Alaska Stat. § 25.23.050(a) (1991) (providing that consent is not required from a parent
who has abandoned the child for at least six months or from a non-custodial parent who
has failed to communicate meaningfully with the child or failed to provide support for at
least one year); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 60.6 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that consent is
unnecessary from a parent who has failed to pay child support for one year) (upheld in
Hergenreder, 899 P.2d at 1160-61). These statutes seem to be applied only in cases in
which a stepparent seeks to adopt and to provide a substitute for the defaulting biological
parent. We found no cases in which the custodial parent alone successfully effected
termination of the rights of the defaulting parent.
179 Only because the child's basic needs are met by her custodial parent is a limited
fatherly role in her interest. In this regard, this context differs significantly from that of
adoption placement.
180 Modern family law is increasingly based on principles of liberal individualism, a
trend which has been criticized as promoting selfish behavior. In the mid-1980s, Carl
Schneider observed that moral discourse in family law has declined in the past generation.
See Schneider, supra note 30, at 1805-08; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating
Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 687, 708-17 (discussing the trend
toward liberal family law and the communitarian critique of the trend). In the regulation
of the parent-child relationship, however, reforms in family law have placed increasingly
forceful emphasis on parental obligation. This has been particularly true in the
enforcement of non-custodial parents' financial obligations. See supra notes 113-14.
181 Certainly, the political climate today is one in which more stringent enforcement of
parental obligation is favored. The polemical tone of Republican critiques of welfare
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selfish behavior in parents and encourage them to align their
child's interests with their own.
The law's purpose in promoting the alignment of parent-child
interests, for unmarried fathers and for other parents, is a central
insight of the relational model. As our earlier analysis indicates,
role satisfaction is a key component of successful performance by
parents. Thus, any regime directed toward discouraging selfish
parental conduct requires a means of rewarding good parenting
and encouraging commitment. Legal protection of parental rights
and authority serves as an important form of compensation for ful-
fillment of parental obligations and thus functions to serve the
child's interest in xeceiving good care from her parents. The con-
ventional analytic model that balances parental rights against, the
child's interest misperceives this function. The problem with
parental rights is not the grant of authority to parents but rather
the failure to recognize the instrumental function of rights and
authority as an inducement to satisfactory parental performance.
The claim that parental rights are a license to engage in selfish
behavior ignores the function of rights as a mechanism for aligning
conflicting interests.
B. Rules that Exacerbate Conflicts of Interest
Although much of contemporary family law conforms to the
relational model of parents as fiduciaries, the correspondence is
not complete. Some aspects of the legal regulation of parents
appear to exacerbate inherent conflicts between the self-interest of
parents and the interests of their children. To the extent that this
observation is accurate, the descriptive power of the model is
incomplete. This argues for a continuing search 'by family law
scholars for a more complete explanatory theory. It also provides
the basis for a normative critique of those provisions that appear to
reinforce selfish behavior by parents.
policy in the 1994 congressional elections had a flavor of moral outrage at parents who
produce children for whom they cannot care. Newt Gingrich has argued for removal of
welfare children from their homes and placement in orphanages. See Mary McGrory,
Orphanage Idea Has Many Parents, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 1994, at A2; Excerpts from
Speaker Newt Gingrich's Opening Remarks, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1995, at A12. In a more
thoughtful voice, Katharine Bartlett and others have argued that the parent-child
relationship be recast as one of parental obligation. See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 295-306.
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1. Conflicts of Interest in Divorce Law
Parents negotiating with the state over the terms of their future
performance and seeking to maximize their own interests would
predictably bargain for the right to dissolve a truly unhappy mar-
riage which renders cooperative parenting within a family unit
untenable. The state would likely agree to such a term because the
informal norms that are relied upon to shape parental behavior are
vulnerable to breakdown if the parents are in serious conflict.
Thus, the law governing availability of divorce (without the neces-
sity of proving fault against the spouse) is fully compatible with the
model of, the parent as fiduciary.
Some dimensions of contemporary no-fault divorce law, how-
ever, appear to intensify the conflicts of interest between parent
and child. Modem marriage is often characterized as an "at will"
relationship between the spouses. Thus, either spouse can termi-
nate the relationship at any time for any reason (or no reason)
upon notice to the other.182 The goal of modern divorce law is to
facilitate a "clean break," so that the parties will be free to pursue
their personal ends, including new intimate relationships, unen-
cumbered by an unhappy marriage. 83
This approach, grounded in norms of short-term, rational self-
interest, ostensibly does not affect parents' obligation toward their
children. In at least two ways, however, the recent understanding
of marriage and divorce as a means of self-actualization discounts
the importance of parental obligation and encourages self-inter-
ested behavior by parents. First, divorcing parents receive no
encouragement to consider the impact of family dissolution on
their children. The law presumes that if either spouse is dissatisfied
with the marriage, then termination is appropriate. Further, the
dominant "clean break" norms of modern divorce law may obscure
182 Indeed, the freedom of spouses to terminate marriage with no sanction for breach
goes beyond any bases for termination under contract law. See Scott, supra note 180, at
720-25.
183 Modem divorce law at one level reflects the application of principles of liberal
individualism to the regulation of family relationships, a broad trend in family law in this
century. In some regards, however, modem no-fault divorce law distorts liberal principles
in discounting the possibility of binding, enforceable, voluntary commitments between
spouses. See id. at 725 (arguing that legal recognition of binding contractual commitments
between spouses are consistent with liberal principles); see also Scott, supra note 48, at 21.
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the incompatible norm that obligation to children continues even
though the marriage is dissolved.
a. The Right to Divorce and Children's Welfare
Divorce is a major disruption of children's lives. The negative
effects on psychological adjustment and financial security for many
children have been well documented.'84 Although parents (and
policymakers) may find comfort in the assumption that divorce is
better for children than is being raised in an unhappy family, the
empirical evidence offers little support for this view. As a general
matter, except in families in which children experience serious con-
flict between their parents,18 5 divorce has more costs than benefits
for children.
Nevertheless, parents contemplating divorce face few legal
incentives to subordinate their individual interest to that of their
children or even to take children's interests into account. This is
evidenced most strikingly by the fact that children, whose interests
are profoundly affected by divorce, have no standing to object to
the dissolution of the family and no right to be represented in the
proceeding in which their future is determined. Nor can a spouse
object to the divorce on the ground that the children of the mar-
riage will be harmed. Current law sanctions "quickie" divorces,
permitting spouses to exit the marriage without requiring any
period of reflection on the impact of divorce on their children. 86
The relational model of parents as fiduciaries would suggest, to
the contrary, that legal oversight of parental choice is warranted
under these circumstances. In the context of spousal conflict and
dissatisfaction, extralegal factors that otherwise align the interests
of parent and child in the intact family may no longer function to
constrain parental choices. The model would predict provisions in
divorce law that reduced the risk that the child's interest would be
184 For a detailed description of the psychological and economic research examining the
impact of divorce on children, see Scott, supra note 48, at 25-37.
185 It is well-established that the most destructive aspect of divorce for children is
exposure to serious interparental conflict. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 143, at 490-92
(citing studies).
186 See Scott, supra note 48, at 26.
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subordinated.187 To be sure, legal impediments to divorce impose
costs on parents by constraining parental authority and auton-
omy.'88 Nevertheless, the relational model suggests that such costs
are more than off-set by reductions in the ex ante risk of potential
conflicts of interest. A legal rule that constrained parental choices
about divorce would function as a substitute for extralegal norms
rendered less effective by the prospect of family dissolution.
b. Clean Breaks and Child Support
Once parents divorce, their future actions are influenced by a
"clean break" policy that dominates modem divorce law. This
norm, which, for example, supports a preference for short term
rehabilitative alimony and lump sum property settlements, pro-
motes, efficient disentanglement of divorced couples.8 9 It signals
that former spouses should be free of financial and other ties so
187 Several plausible reforms would be consistent with the model. For example, a
mandatory waiting period before divorce is granted increases the likelihood that long-term
rather than short-term goals will be pursued. Such a "cooling-off" period is premised on
the assumption that most parents are inclined to consider their children's interest over the
longer term, but that short-term preoccupation with rtarital conflict or alternative
relationships may distort decisionmaking. A period of mandatory delay before divorce
also encourages parents, in a general way, to make careful, thoughtful (and thus more
accurate) decisions. See Scott, supra note 48, at 76-78. Distortion caused by deviation
between long-term and short-term preferences could also be mitigated by increasing
parents' access to information concerning the child's interests through counseling,
mediation, and the like. Further, mandatory mediation of custody disputes encourages
parents to shift their attention from their selfish separate interests to their mutual interest
in planning for post-divorce arrangements that serve their children's interest. Finally (and
most radically), a court-appointed guardian ad litem could be charged with representing
the child's interests in the divorce proceedings and advising the court regarding the costs to
the child of awarding divorce.
188 The costs of reducing the conflict of interest when parents consider divorce are
modest by comparison with the costs of more intrusive monitoring of parental behavior
after divorce, when the assumption that extralegal factors constrain the conflict of interest
becomes far weaker. See infra text accompanying notes 134-42.
189 Short-term rehabilitative alimony allows the dependent partner to obtain education
or skills so that she can support herself. Permanent spousal support is virtually a thing of
the past in many states. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(d) (1993) (providing that
alimony shall generally be limited to a period not to exceed 50% of the duration of
marriage). The trend toward rehabilitative alimony is based in part on the assumption that
men will remarry and have new family responsibilities. See Turner v. urner, 385 A.2d
1280, 1281-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
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that they can enter new relationships and form new families. 19°
This message contributes to an attenuated sense of financial
responsibility toward the children of the prior marriage.
The clean break policy supports reductions in child support pay-
ments-on the ground of "changed circumstances"-when an obli-
gor parent has a new spouse and/or child to support. 191 This
"changed circumstance" criterion is complicated because the rule is
driven in part by parental obligation to children in the new family.
Nonetheless, the rule exacerbates conflicts of interest by encourag-
ing parents to pursue their interest in creating a new family,
thereby marginally undermining their pre-existing parental obliga-
tion. By weakening the informal norms that serve to align the
interests of parents and children, the clean break policy pits the
financial security of children against the personal fulfillment of par-
ents.' 92 Harmonizing the "clean break" norm with the notion of
190 See Turner, 385 A.2d at 1282 ("The law should provide both parties with the
opportunity to make a new life . . . . Neither should be shackled by the unnecessary
burdens of an unhappy marriage.").
191 See Berg v. Berg, 359 A.2d 354, 356 (R.I. 1976) ("It is recognized in ... [many]
jurisdictions that the expenses incurred by a divorced father's remarriage may be
considered in determining whether child support payments should be reduced, terminated,
or, increased."); accord Cagwin v. Cagwin, 245 P.2d 379, 380 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952):
LaBove v. LaBove, 503 So.2d 670, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Belke v. Belke, No. 0749-93-2,
1994 WL 369718, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); see also Ira M. Ellman, Paul M. Kurtz &
Katharine T. Bartlett, Family Law 482-85 (2d ed. 1991) (considering the rule that
remarriage may justify reduction in child support); C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Remarriage of
Parent as Basis for Modification of Amount of Child Support Provisions of Divorce
Decree, 89 A.L.R.2d 106, 115-18 (1963) (citing cases). But see Dorgan v. Dorgan, 571
N.E.2d 325, 326-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that father's remarriage and adoption of
new wife's children did not warrant reduction in child support); Young v. Young, 762
S.W.2d 535, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that birth of father's child of second
marriage did not require reduction of child support); State v. Reed, 658 So.2d 774, (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (same); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 610 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (App. Div. 1994)
(same).
Statutes are often written to give courts broad discretion. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 240(1-b)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1995) ("Where the court finds that the non-custodial
parent's pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate, the
court shall order the non-custodial parent to pay such amount of child support as the court
finds just and appropriate . . . ."); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1-b)(f) (McKinney Supp.
1995) (providing that court may adjust child support if non-custodial parent must provide
for other children not involved in the case at hand); Cal. Fam. Code. § 3651(a) (West 1994)
(providing that, with certain exceptions, "a support order may be modified or terminated
at any time as the court determines to be necessary").
192 It should give one pause to consider how improbable such a rule would seem in a
commercial context. Consider the response to a debtor who, outside of the context of
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fiduciary responsibility requires giving priority to the claims of chil-
dren of the dissolved marriage over later-in-time obligations. As
with any precommitment, parents understand that future opportu-
nities for self-fulfillment are limited by their responsibility to
existing children.
2. Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship
We have argued that the Supreme Court's recognition of the
rights of unmarried fathers adheres to fiduciary principles in its
encouragement and protection of fathers' efforts to fulfill parental
responsibilities. In other contexts, however, legal deference
toward parental rights can undermine the interests of children. In
the case of parents whose children are removed due to abuse or
neglect, legal regulation of the termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship has lacked conceptual coherence. In practice, if not in
design, the legal process for terminating the rights of deficient par-
ents reflects an unresolved tension between what are understood to
be the conflicting goals of protecting parental rights and promoting
the child's welfare. Courts also show curious tolerance of absentee
non-custodial parents if no substitute parent has formally adopted
the child. Viewed from the perspective of the relational model of
parents as fiduciaries, the results are often inconsistent and
counterproductive.
a. The Inadequate But Involved Parent
Current policy requires that an abused or neglected child
removed from the custody of a parent should either be returned
quickly upon remediation by parents or placed permanently in an
adoptive home following termination of parental rights.19 3 In prac-
bankruptcy, has incurred additional financial obligations and, on that basis, seeks to reduce
her outstanding debt to her original creditor.
193 This 'is the fundamental goal of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The
Senate Finance Committee Report stated this objective at the outset:
In particular, the incentive structure of present law is modified to lessen the
emphasis on foster care placement and to encourage greater efforts to find
permanent homes for children either by making it possible for them to return to
their own families or by placing them in adoptive homes.
S. Rep. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1450.
For detailed analysis of the provisions of the Act, see Allen et al., supra note 154.
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tice, however, courts are reluctant to terminate the rights of par-
ents despite their inability competently to assume full
responsibility for their children. This leaves children in limbo, as
parents' probationary period is extended indefinitely and perma-
nent placement is postponed.194 The standard criticism is that this
judicial distortion of stated policy is driven by excessive deference
toward the rights of biological parents.
We think the issue is more complex. The current regime,
through the threatened sanction of termination of parental rights
and the reward of regained custody, creates powerful incentives for
those parents who both desire custody of their children and are
able to remediate. It does not, however, seek to motivate less able
parents to maintain a relationship with their children, although the
bond may have substantial value to the child. Many parents whose
performance is suboptimal have a substantial relationship with
their children and make efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to remediate
the conditions that led to their children's removal. A continued
relationship may in fact serve the child's interest.195 This intuition
contributes to a reluctance by some courts to sever the parent-child
relatiQnship, a response which, in the current legal framework,
leaves the child's status uncertain. Further, the signals to parents
are confusing and blurred; the threat of termination always hovers,
but is rarely carried out.
Under this scheme, the law's instrumental function of encourag-
ing parental commitment is surely diluted. Straightforward legal
reinforcement of the efforts of suboptimal parents, together with
permanent custodial placement of the child with adequate substi-
tute parents, might better serve the child's interest than the current
ambivalence. To be sure, in some cases continuing a relationship is
harmful to the child. In general, however, the older the child and
the greater the duration of the parent-child relationship, the more
194 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
195 Psychological research supports the claim that severing the biological parent-child
bond can be costly to children, even if the child has a tenuous relationship with the parent
and the alternative placement is independently desirable. See Garrison, supra note 51, at
461-67 (citing studies).
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costly is the decision to terminate parental rights.196 A sensible
legal rule would capture this insight.197
b. The "Enoch Arden" 9g Parent
Courts routinely terminate the parental rights of the biological
parent who has not maintained any relationship with the child, so
as to allow adoption by stepparents. When substitute social par-
ents have not formally established parental status, however, non-
196 Common sense argues that termination is less costly if the child is young or if the
parent has failed over an extended period to maintain meaningful contact. Moreover, for
older children with a substantial filial bond, the probability that a substitute parent can or
will fill the parental role is not great. Older children are less likely to be adopted at all and
more likely to face a series of foster placements.
Marsha Garrison extensively analyzes the clinical literature on the need of older adopted
children and children in foster care for continued contact with their parents. See Garrison,
supra note 51, at 461-72. Garrison concludes that the earlier a child is adopted, the less
likely the adoptee is to have emotional problems, citing the following studies:
Humphrey & Ounsted, Adoptive Families Referred for Psychiatric Advice, I: The
Children, 109 Brit. J. Psychiatry 599, 604-05 (1963) (children adopted after six
months of, age are more likely to exhibit symptoms of disturbed social behavior,
stealing, cruelty, destructiveness, and lying); Jameson, Psychiatric Disorder in
Adopted Children in Texas, 63 Tex. Med. 83 (1967) (greater incidence of severe
psychiatric illness in children adopted after infancy); Offord, Aponte & Cross,
Presenting Symptomatology of Adopted Children, 20 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 110,
116 (1969) ("[t]he later the ge of adoption, the greater the frequency and severity
of the antisocial behavior."); See also S. Wolff, Children Under Stress 107-08 (2d ed.
1981) (a child's age is a main factor associated with the adoption outcome). But cf.
Schwam & Tuskan, [The Adopted Child, in 1 Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry
342, 345-46 (Joseph D. Noshpitz ed., 1979)] (it is unclear whether.these studies can
be generalized throughout adopted population).
Id. at 471 n.223.
197 A more tailored two-tiered scheme that might better reduce conflicts of interest
could be rationalized within a fiduciary framework. Under such an approach, termination
of parental rights would be ordered in cases of serious harmful impact or abandonment of
the relationship-the failure to maintain meaningful contact. In other cases, parents'
failure to remediate deficiencies adequately would lead to denial of the child's return to
parental custody, substituting instead permanent state (or third party) custody with
parental visitation rights. The parent who cares about continuing her relationship would
understand that preserving the bond with her child requires effort, and that efforts will be
rewarded. Moreover, under a regime that offers permanence to the child without
termination of parental rights, courts would likely be prepared to make the decision
regarding permanent placement more expeditiously than under the current regime.
19s This term describes a person who suddenly returns after a long absence from which
he was not expected to return at all. It comes from Tennyson's poem, "Enoch Arden."
See Alfred Lord Tennyson, Enoch Arden (1864), reprinted in The Poetic and Dramatic
Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson 227 (Cambridge ed., Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1898).
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the absent parent a subsequent opportunity to develop the rela-
tionship. The benefits of such an approach are obvious when the
stepparent has established a parental relationship and the con-
testing biological parent is a remote figure. When the single custo-
dial parent protests, the prospect of increased financial support
might seem to argue against a sanction for material breach (indeed,
the child may benefit from a relationship with the absent parent).
Relational theory suggests, however, that the judgment to forego
financial support as well as other possible benefits is properly left
to the custodial parent, whose interests are presumptively better
aligned with the child's. The underlying theme of this analysis is
that parents should be encouraged to create and maintain a parent-
child relationship which represents their "best efforts," given their
circumstances and capacities: This goal requires sanctions for par-
ents' default and rewards for efforts to invest in the relationship
with the child.
3. Informal Norms of Responsibility and Parental Rights
The relational model points to the centrality of extralegal social
norms that function to align parents' and children's interests in the
intact family. Indeed, in contrast to other fiduciary contexts, these
norms are imbedded in the culture and are not primarily legal con-
structions. A variety of cultural influences reinforce the common
belief that the role of parent is intrinsically desirable, socially
important and imbued with responsibility. 0 2 For many people,
personal fulfillment is linked to having children and rearing them
successfully. Parents who default on their responsibility meet
intense social disapproval, as is evidenced by public outrage over
child abuse and neglect.20 3
202 A 1986 Roper phone poll of 1654 American adults found that 95% of the
respondents felt "being a good parent" was "very important" to their "idea of success."
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Feb. 1987, available in Westlaw, Poll database.
203 Examples include the angry public response to crack-addicted mothers exposing
their infants to the dangers of addiction, Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent Victims, Time, May
13, 1991, at 56; Tom Morganthau, The Orphanage, Newsweek, Dec. 12, 1994, at 28; fathers
who fail to pay child support, supra note 113; and evidence of the harmful psychological
impact of divorce, Pamela Lansden, Going Home Alone, Too, Newsweek, Dec. 28, 1992, at
7; all seem particularly intense because of a sense that there has been a breach of a
fiduciary obligation.
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custodial biological parents are far more likely to succeed in assert-
ing parental rights. Thus, stepparents, grandparents and others
who have functioned as parents can have their claim trumped when
the absent biological parent returns and claims custody. 199 In other
cases, the custodial parent dies, and the non-custodial biological
parent seeks custody, often prevailing over the faithful grandparent
or stepparent who has not adopted the child, but who has func-
tioned in a parental role.20 Finally, cases in which the custodial,
single parent objects in vain when the defaulting parent petitions
for visitation rights. In a typical case, the custodial mother is rais-
ing the child alone (or with a female partner) when the non-custo-
dial parent appears to claim visitation rights.20 In all of these
cases, a haphazard interest-balancing approach vindicates parental
rights without promoting responsibilitr and commitment-often at
the cost of the child's relationship with a functional parent.
To the extent that the law affords parents an indefinite opportu-
nity to develop a relationship with their child, it fails to motivate
them to accommodate other interests to the responsibilities of
parenthood. The relational model argues instead for sanctioning
fundamental failures to assume parental responsibilities by denying
199 See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y. 1971);
In re Ronald FF v. Cindy GG, 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987).
200 See, e.g., Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (awarding custody
to the biological father, rather than stepfather, after mother's suicide); In re S.B.L., 553
A.2d 1078 (Vt. 1988) (awarding custody to the biological father, rather than maternal
grandfather, after the mother was killed in a car accident); see also Margaret M. Mahoney,
Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 38,
74-78 (1984) (discussing the "natural parent preference" in custody disputes between
biological parents and stepparents).
Today, the law has evolved to the extent that stepparents have a reasonable chance of
winning custody against seriously defaulting biological parents. See In re Osborne, 21
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1478 (Kan. Ct. App. August 22, 1995) (holding that wife of deceased
custodial father may intervene in divorce action versus former wife to seek custody of
stepchildren); Mahoney, supra. For proposed reforms, see Fine & Fine, supra note 28, at
78; Janet L. Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the
Definition of Parent, 16 Nova L. Rev. 733, 765-66 (1992).
201 See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994) (granting an order of
filiation to the father to confer standing upon him to seek visitation rights); see also
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (granting sperm donor visitation rights,
rejecting claim to right of family autonomy by mother and female partner). In a case with
which we are familiar, the unmarried father left after the child's birth and the mother alone
cared for the child until she was six years old. At this point, the father returned and was
granted visitation rights over the mother's objections.
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Some evidence suggests that interwoven with this conception of
the parental role is a distaste for legal norms of parental entitle-
ment. There is a persistent public perception that the law grants to
biological parents a property-like interest in their children, and
that this often results in legal outcomes that are harmful to the
child's interest.2°4 The sense that social norms and legal rules are
divergent is reinforced in the popular culture by cases such as
"Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard," in which courts have ordered
the removal of young children from their adoptive families and
returned them to their biological parents. °5 While public response
in both cases is based perhaps on a distorted view of the legal situa-
tion,20 6 the reaction indicates a powerful disquiet with a legal
regime that speaks in the language of parental rights.
The paradox of contemporary family law, as the preceding analy-
sis reveals, is the uneasy coexistence of legal outcomes that largely
fit within a fiduciary framework together with legal rhetoric that
continues to emphasize parental rights without responsibility. The
divergence of legal outcomes and legal language is commonplace in
the common law tradition, but even divorced from results, rhetoric
grounded in parental rights can undermine the effects of social
norms in subtle but pervasive ways. Conflicting signals are sent by
a legal regime that emphasizes parental rights as well as the welfare
of the child, but links the two by balancing the one against the
other. It is not suprising that this is understood to mean that when
parental rights are vindicated, children's welfare is sacrificed.
204 See supra note 9. Many family law scholars have criticized the rhetoric of rights in
family law. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 43; Glendon, supra note 44; Minow, supra note
44; Bartlett, supra note 7.
205 See supra note 8.
206 Few critics focused on the fact that Daniel Schmidt asserted his interest soon after
the birth of Baby Jessica, and that much of the delay was due to the DeBoers' pursuit of
appeals. See DeBoer v. Schmidt (In Re Baby Girl Clausen), 502 N.W.2d 649, 652-54
(Mich. 1993) (recounting the procedural history of the case). Similarly, Otakar Kirchner
made efforts to find his child despite the mother's claim that the baby had died, and when
he was finally successful 57 days after the birth, he immediately petitioned for custody. See
In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994) ("When the father entered his
appearance in the adoption proceedings 57 days after the baby's birth and demanded his
rights as a father, the petitioners should have relinquished the baby at that time. It was
their decision to prolong this litigation through a lengthy, and ultimately fruitless,
appeal."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 891 (1995). Moreover, in the latter case, the adoptive
parents' attorney knew that the mother was withholding the father's name, but made no
effort to identify him. Id.
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The central insight of the fiduciary heuristic is to focus attention
on the reciprocal relationship between parental rights and chil-
dren's interests. The contract metaphor makes explicit what is
implicit in social norms: parental "rights" are granted as compensa-
tion for the satisfactory performance of voluntarily assumed
responsibilities to provide for the child's interests. It follows that
substantial default on those responsibilities leads to the loss, in
whole or in part, of the instruments of parental authority. We have
argued that the outcomes (as distinct from the rhetoric) of modem
family law are substantially consistent with this relational model of
parents as fiduciaries. The dissonance lies in the use of an inapt
doctrinal framework to regulate a dynamic relationship. Unlike
the "law of rights," a fiduciary framework consistently underscores
and reinforces norms of parental responsibility and obligation as
conditions to the reciprocal obligation of the state to provide com-
pensation for satisfactory performance.
The changing legal response to non-custodial divorced parents
suggests that the evolution of family law doctrine may be under-
way. Pre-reform child support enforcement was lax, encouraging
parents to assume that pursuit of their own interests to the detri-
ment of their children's welfare was acceptable behavior. Over the
last decade, tough enforcement measures have been enacted which
function to require parents to consider "their child's interest
together with their own.20 7 These measures send strong signals that
the law requires parents to fulfill their obligations. At the same
time, legal reforms have expanded the relationship claims and the
role of non-custodial parents.20 8 Laws that encourage shared cus-
207 See supra notes 113-14 (summarizing contemporary child support enforcement
measures).
208 See David J. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 Far. L.Q. 345, 364-65 (1979); Scott &
Derdeyn, supra note 143. In addition to joint custody, some states require custodial
parents to give non-custodial parents access to medical and school records. See, e.g., La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:351 (West Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-33(11) (1995);
McDougal v. McDougal, 422 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1992) (denying father joint custody but
granting access to medical and school records). Custody law encourages parents to
cooperate and to support the child's relationship with the other parent. See supra note 150
(discussing friendly parent provision and parental alienation syndrome).
Courts also may require custodial parents to give non-custodial parents some latitude in
sharing their religious beliefs with their children. Courts have enforced prenuptial
agreements providing for the religious upbringing of the child when the custodial parent
seeks to change the child's religious training. See Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142
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tody and offer increased participation and authority to non-custo-
dial parents are often justified on the ground that parents who have
a strong relationship are more likely to fulfill their financial
responsibilities.20 9
Modem child custody and support doctrine thus links responsi-
bility and rights much more explicitly than previously and under-
scores the instrumental function of rights.2 10  This approach
presumes that parental role satisfaction is tied to successful per-
formance, and that the noncustodial parent's commitment to act in
ways that reduce potential conflicts of interest are, to a degree,
contingent on relationship rewards.
CONCLUSION
The relational model of parents as fiduciaries provides a
purchase from which to evaluate the evolution of contemporary
family law on issues relating to the state's role in the family. This
perspective differs from the traditional interest-balancing approach
that pits the state's interest in protecting children against parents'
(App. Div. 1982); Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (Sup. Ct. 1961); see also
Gruber v. Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117, 122 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that father must fulfill
promise to enroll children in yeshivah as per separation agreement). But see Lynch v.
Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 1956) (holding antenuptial agreement on child's
religious upbringing void for vagueness). Courts will also sometimes uphold a non-
custodial parent's right to have the child participate in religious activities different from
those of the custodial parent when with the non-custodial parent. See, e.g., Murga v.
Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Ct. App. 1980); Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Mass.
1981). But see Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (granting
exclusive control over religious education of children to custodial parent); Morris v.
Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that Jehovah's Witness non-
custodial father could not take daughter along on door-to-door solicitations).
209 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
210 An emerging issue that is being reexamined in this light is the relationship between
visitation rights of the non-custodial parent and the obligation to pay child support.
Traditionally, these were not interdependent-at least not in doctrine. Failure to pay child
support did not result in loss of visitation rights, and the custodial parent's (or child's)
undermining of the ability to exercise visitation rights did not absolve the obligor parent of
the duty to pay child support. The trend is to link visitation rights and child support
obligations. For an overview of the doctrine and the split amongst the different states, see
Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20 Rutgers
L.J. 619 (1989); Carolyn E. Taylor, Note, Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning of
Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1059 (1984); Greg M. Geismann,
Comment, Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law Chain: Child Support and
Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L. Rev. 568 (1993).
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rights. A relational perspective clarifies the core objective of legal
regulation: to function in concert with extralegal influences so as to
encourage optimal parental behavior. In turn, this objective
focuses attention on the reciprocal relationship between parental
obligation and parental role satisfaction. The filial bond is central
to the lives of both parents and children, is intense and intimate,
and requires privacy to flourish.2 1 ' This, rather than any notion of
entitlement, is the justification for the initial deference to parental
judgments about children's interests. Maintaining the filial bond,
however, requires arrangements to guard against conflicts of inter-
est as well as means of compensating parents for avoiding such
conflicts. In a very real sense these arrangements confer on parents
the status of fiduciaries with the corresponding rights and obliga-
tions that such a relationship necessarily implies.
211 Privacy may be important in some other fiduciary relationships, such as that of
attorneys and clients and possibly guardians and wards. Given the important role of
judicial supervision as a monitoring mechanism in most fiduciary relationships, however,
the value of privacy does not seem to be given a great deal of weight.
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